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Mainstreaming Privacy Torts
Danielle Keats Citron†
In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis proposed a privacy
tort and seventy years later, William Prosser conceived it as four
wrongs. In both eras, privacy invasions primarily caused psychic and
reputational wounds of a particular sort. Courts insisted upon
significant proof due to those injuries’ alleged ethereal nature.
Digital networks alter this calculus by exacerbating the injuries
inflicted. Because humiliating personal information posted online has
no expiration date, neither does individual suffering. Leaking
databases of personal information and postings encouraging assaults
invade privacy in ways that exact significant financial and physical
harm. It would be nearly impossible now to argue that these injuries
are mere trivialities.
Unfortunately, privacy tort law is ill-equipped to address these
changes. Prosser built the modern privacy torts based on precedent
and a desire to redress harm. Although Prosser’s approach
succeeded in the courts because it blended theory and practice, it
conceptually narrowed the interest that privacy tort law sought to
protect. Whereas Warren and Brandeis conceived privacy tort law as
protecting a person’s right to develop his personality free from
unwanted publicity and unwanted access by others, Prosser saw it as
addressing specific emotional, reputational, and proprietary injuries
caused by four kinds of activities prevalent in the twentieth century.
Copyright © 2010 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of
their publications.
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Since then, courts have too often rigidly interpreted the four privacy
torts. Prosser’s conceptualization of privacy interests worth
protecting is too narrow to accommodate the privacy interests
implicated by networked technologies. As a result, the privacy torts
often cannot properly redress contemporary privacy injuries.
A potential solution lies in taking the best of what Prosser had to
offer—his method of borrowing from doctrine and focusing on injury
prevention and remedy—while ensuring that proposed solutions are
transitional and dynamic. Any updates to privacy tort law should
protect the broader set of interests identified by Warren and
Brandeis, notably a person’s right to be free from unwanted
intrusions and disclosures of personal information. While leaking
databases and certain online postings compromise that interest,
courts could invoke long-standing tort remedies to address these
wrongs, rather than conceiving new, potentially unattainable, privacy
torts. To that end, courts could employ mainstream tort doctrines
rather than creating new privacy torts. They might also consider the
ways that the internet magnifies privacy harms in assessing privacy
claims to ensure law’s recognition of them.
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INTRODUCTION
Privacy tort law is a product of prior centuries‘ hazards. In the late
nineteenth century, snap cameras and recording devices provided a cheap way
to capture others‘ private moments without detection.1 The penny press profited
from the publication of revealing photographs and gossip about people‘s
personal lives.2
Two scholars of the late nineteenth century, Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis, responded by calling for tort law to protect individuals‘ ―right to be
let alone.‖3 According to them, a privacy tort would secure for each person the
right to determine ―to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall
be communicated to others.‖4 In other words, it would permit individuals to
decide ―whether that which is [theirs] shall be given to the public.‖5 In their
view, the privacy tort protected individuals‘ ability to decide how much
personal information is revealed to others and, in this way, to develop their
―inviolate personality‖ without interference.6 Daniel Solove has characterized
Warren and Brandeis‘s ―right to be let alone‖ as ―view[ing] privacy as a type of
immunity or seclusion.‖7
Courts gradually recognized tort claims based on Warren and Brandeis‘s
―right to privacy‖ formulation.8 In early cases, the privacy tort protected against
a filmmaker‘s release of a movie documenting a woman‘s operation9 and a
landlord‘s placement of a hidden camera in a couple‘s bedroom.10 It remedied a
newspaper‘s revelation of a woman‘s humiliating disease11 and the publication
1. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
. 193,
194 (1890).
2. Id. at 196.
3. Id. at 193.
4. Id. at 198.
5. Id. at 199; see Amy Gajda, Judging Journalism: The Turn Toward Privacy and Judicial
Regulation of the Press, 97
. 1039, 1045–48 (2009) (discussing the ―legally
protected interest‖ arising from Warren and Brandeis‘s The Right to Privacy as people‘s need to
be free from unwanted publicity and unwanted invasions from yellow journalists and gossip
mongers).
6. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 198.
7. Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90
. 1087, 1101 (2002)
[hereinafter Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy]. Solove explained that Warren and Brandeis did not
intend to provide a comprehensive theory of privacy. Id. Instead, they simply wanted to ―explore
the roots of a right to privacy in the common law and explain how such a right could develop.‖ Id.
8.
§ 117 (5th ed.
1984) [hereinafter
] (explaining that privacy torts are an outstanding
illustration of the influence of legal periodicals on the courts); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48
383, 422 (1960); see, e.g., Mau v. Rio Grande Oil, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 845, 846
(N.D. Cal. 1939) (attributing California and southern states‘ recognition of privacy torts to Warren
and Brandeis‘s ―right to be let alone‖ formulation in the Harvard Law Review).
9. Feeney v. Young, 181 N.Y.S. 481 (App. Div. 1920).
10. Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239 (N.H. 1964).
11. Barber v. Time, Inc., 159 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. 1942) (involving the publication of the
name and picture of a woman with an eating disorder in her hospital room).
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of nude pictures taken by the police.12 It also redressed an insurance company‘s
unauthorized use of someone‘s image in its advertising campaign.13
These twentieth-century privacy intrusions inflicted injuries of a particular
sort. They harmed individuals‘ ―peace of mind,‖ causing humiliation and
mental distress.14 They tainted people‘s images in the community, resulting in
lost jobs and businesses.15 And they undermined people‘s ability to control
their public persona.16 In Warren and Brandeis‘s estimation, privacy intrusions
produced ―mental pain and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere
bodily injury.‖17
Yet, because those privacy invasions involved twentieth-century
technologies, revelations of embarrassing personal information and intrusions
into private spheres were often temporary. Films, for example, appeared in
theaters for a limited time and although they might have been archived for
future viewing, only a small number of people likely viewed them. Newspapers
remained in circulation for only a few days and then lingered in little-seen
library files.
Although twenty-first century technologies can similarly interfere with
individual privacy, they magnify the harm suffered. The searchable, permanent
nature of the internet extends the life and audience of privacy disclosures, and
exacerbates individuals‘ emotional and reputational injuries. For instance, if
pictures and videos of a young girl‘s sexual abuse are posted online, they may
remain there indefinitely, ensuring that the victim remains haunted by the abuse
as an adult.18 Likewise, individuals‘ creditworthiness and employability can be
seriously compromised when businesses fail to secure databases of personal
information from identity thieves.19 Further, people can suffer physical harm
after website operators host postings that encourage third parties to assault
individuals.20

12. York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 939 (1964); see also
Trammell v. Citizen‘s News Co., Inc. 148 S.W.2d 708 (Ky. 1941) (involving the publication of a
person‘s debt).
13. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 69–70 (Ga. 1905).
14. Id. at 197; see, e.g., Housh v. Peth, 133 N.E.2d 340, 343 (Ohio 1956).
15.
175 (2008) [hereinafter
,
].
16. These intrusions also lowered social standards, perverting and belittling discourse.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 196.
17. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 196.
18. See John Schwartz, Child Pornography, and an Issue of Restitution,
, Feb.
3, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/03/us/03offender.html.
19. Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and Private Law
at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80
. 241, 251–53 (2007) [hereinafter Citron,
Reservoirs of Danger].
20.
100 (2007) [hereinafter
,
]; Ben Neary, Internet
Rape Case Jolts Wyoming City,
, Feb. 6, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?
id=9766537.
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Unfortunately, privacy tort law is ill-suited to address these changes.
William Prosser reshaped tort law‘s protection of the ―right to privacy‖ as the
Reporter for the Second Restatement on Torts in the 1950s, and the privacy tort
framework has not been modified to address the modern challenges arising
since that time.21 Prosser created a privacy taxonomy based on his twin
interests in doctrine and policymaking. For Prosser, privacy tort law protected
against emotional, reputational, and proprietary injuries caused by (1) public
disclosure of private facts, (2) intrusion on seclusion, (3) depiction of another in
a false light, and (4) appropriation of another‘s image for commercial gain.22
Although Prosser‘s privacy taxonomy tackled privacy injuries caused by
twentieth-century technologies, it may not be dynamic enough to address
privacy injuries produced by digital networks. This is partially attributable to
the taxonomy‘s narrow articulation of the interests that privacy tort law
protected. Whereas Warren and Brandeis saw privacy tort law as broadly
protecting the right to develop one‘s personality free from unwanted access and
exposure, Prosser conceived it as narrowly addressing the emotional,
reputational, and proprietary harm produced by the four privacy-threatening
activities prevalent in his time. Then, too, courts have rigidly applied Prosser‘s
taxonomy, perhaps because of their skepticism about ―psychic wounds.‖23 This
has left many of today‘s privacy injuries—exacerbated by modern
technologies—without privacy tort solutions.
Consider today‘s databases that leak personal information to criminals, as
well as certain online postings of personal information. When insecure
databases release individuals‘ Social Security numbers to identity thieves, they
interfere with those individuals‘ interest in keeping their sensitive personal
information from others. Likewise, website operators who reveal individuals‘
home addresses, along with instructions for viewers to assault them, deprive
those individuals of their right to be ―let alone.‖ These operators invade
people‘s anonymity, exposing them to being watched, followed, and attacked
by assailants. Although these practices impinge upon individuals‘ privacy, the
four privacy torts fail to address them.
Even in cases covered by Prosser‘s four privacy torts, courts may deny
recovery, despite plaintiffs‘ significant suffering. To prevent privacy plaintiffs
from recovering for trivialities, courts have erected a number of substantial
barriers to recovery.24 Thus, plaintiffs often must prove that the defendant
21.
176 (2003).
22. Prosser, supra note 8, at 422–23.
23. From the start, courts took a skeptical view of privacy tort claims because they
responded to intangible injuries that were difficult to measure.
supra note 21, at 176; cf.
Danielle Keats Citron, Law‘s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender Harassment, 108
. 373, 393 (2009) [hereinafter Citron, Law‘s Expressive Value] (explaining that
nineteenth-century tort law discounted women‘s suffering by refusing to recognize claims mainly
pursued by women, such as those for emotional distress).
24. Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31
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intended to invade another‘s privacy,25 that the defendant‘s conduct was
―highly offensive to the reasonable person,‖ and that the information was
sufficiently private.26
In the past, embarrassing disclosures of private facts might have fallen
short of a privacy tort‘s ―highly offensive to the reasonable person‖ standard on
the grounds that the harm was minor. Although a newspaper‘s publication of a
person‘s private information might have been embarrassing or unflattering, it
might not have been sufficiently offensive because it did not concern the
sensational or morbid and because memories would surely fade.27 In the
present, however, private facts posted online persist indefinitely, ever
searchable by prospective clients, employers, and friends. This compounds the
emotional and reputational harm that individuals suffer, dispelling prior eras‘
concerns that privacy plaintiffs would recover for trivialities—a concern which
may have contributed to the rigidity of Prosser‘s narrow framework.
In this Article, I argue that privacy tort law should be updated to tackle the
information age‘s privacy injuries. This piece unfolds in three Parts. Part I
highlights how twenty-first century technologies magnify privacy injuries. Part
II traces privacy tort law‘s development, exploring Warren and Brandeis‘s
conception of privacy torts‘ legally protected interest and Prosser‘s more
limited approach. It also explores how Prosser‘s combination of theory and
practice made privacy taxonomy so successful, and yet so rooted in another
time. Finally, it discusses privacy tort law‘s inability to prevent and deter
privacy injuries caused by networked technologies.
Part III suggests strategies for ensuring the prevention and remedy of
contemporary privacy injuries. It considers taking the best of what the privacy
tort‘s intellectual forefathers had to offer while ensuring that it can adapt to
changing technologies. It grapples with ways that courts could enrich Prosser‘s
conception of the interests protected by privacy tort law with those identified
by Warren and Brandeis. In that sense, it considers ways that we can return to
the principles laid out in The Right to Privacy in order to move forward.
Part III then argues that, rather than inventing new privacy torts, privacy
tort law could invoke mainstream tort doctrines to remedy invasions of
individuals‘ right to be ―let alone.‖ As Prosser knew and mined with great
success, tort innovations can have a greater chance of adoption if they derive
from established law. Part III also discusses ways to ensure that the modern

. 326, 328 (1966). Of mental distress damages generally, Calvin Magruder
wrote: ―Against a large part of the frictions and irritations and clashing of temperaments incident
to participation in a community life, a certain toughening of the mental hide is a better protection
than the law could ever be.‖ Calvin Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of
Torts, 49
. 1033, 1035 (1936).
25. See, e.g., McCormick v. Haley, 307 N.E.2d 34, 38 (Ohio Ct. App. 1973).
26.
§ 652B (1977).
27. See, e.g., Virgil v. Sports Illustrated, 424 F. Supp. 1286 (S.D. Cal. 1976).
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privacy torts can tackle emotional and reputational harm caused by damaging
information posted online.
I.
THE CHANGING FACE OF PRIVACY INJURIES
This Part explores how twenty-first century technologies intensify privacy
harm. It discusses how digital networks exacerbate the damage inflicted upon
people‘s psyche and reputations. It also surveys the extensive economic and
physical injuries resulting from today‘s privacy invasions.
A. Mental and Reputational Injuries Intensified
During the nineteenth century and the better part of the twentieth, privacy
intrusions often inflicted psychic and reputational harm.28 Privacy intrusions
interfered with a person‘s ―sentiments, thoughts and feelings,‖29 producing
discomfort and irritation.30 For instance, in Housh v. Peth,31 a creditor
repeatedly called a debtor at work and at home late at night demanding
payment.32 The plaintiff testified that the calls caused her ―nervousness, worry,
humiliation, mental anguish and loss of sleep.‖33 The court determined that the
defendant‘s malicious, systematic harassment invaded the plaintiff‘s right to
privacy.34 Similarly, a court awarded damages for a couple‘s mental suffering
after a photographer published a photograph of their deceased conjoined
twins.35 It reasoned that ―expos[ing] . . . to public view‖ the corpse of a child
invaded ―[t]he most tender affections of the human heart.‖36
Feelings of shame regularly accompanied individuals‘ mental distress. A
husband and wife attested to their humiliation after discovering that their
landlord placed a recording device in their bedroom to listen to their
conversations and sounds.37 The husband explained that he could not perform

28.
, supra note 21, at 234.
29. Flores v. Mosler Safe Co., 164 N.E.2d 853, 855 (N.Y. 1959).
30. Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Commercial Exploitation of Associative
Value of Personality, 39
. 1199, 1205 (1986).
31. 133 N.E.2d 340, 341 (Ohio 1956).
32. Id. at 340.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 344.
35. Douglas v. Stokes, 149 S.W. 849, 850 (Ky. 1912).
36. Id.
37. Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239 (N.H. 1964). In another case, a woman
experienced self-consciousness and embarrassment after a newspaper published a picture of her
after the wind blew up her skirt at an amusement park. Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So.
2d 474, 476 (Ala. 1964); see also Gonzales v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 555 S.W.2d 219, 222–23 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1977) (upholding a privacy claim in a case where a telephone company‘s intrusion on
the plaintiffs‘ home to reclaim phones inflicted significant emotional harm, including the wife‘s
stomach pains and nervousness).
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his normal duties as a father and husband.38 According to the wife, the
experience ―curtailed‖ their sex life.39
In some cases, these feelings had a crippling effect on individuals. In one
instance, a plastic surgeon televised a before-and-after picture of a patient‘s
face-lift without her consent.40 The patient explained that when she learned of
the disclosure she was ―devastated‖ and ―‗felt terrible‘ that everyone at her
former office knew about her face-lift.‖41 Ultimately, she refused to go out in
public.42
The publication of embarrassing information or use of a person‘s image in
an advertisement produced reputational harm as well. For instance, in Melvin v.
Reid,43 the defendant made a movie about the plaintiff‘s years as a prostitute
and her involvement in a murder trial.44 There, the plaintiff‘s disclosed
behavior occurred many years before the defendant made the film; when the
defendant released the picture, the plaintiff had been living a conventional
life.45 The plaintiff brought a privacy suit, alleging that the film exposed her to
public contempt, ridicule, and scorn.46 She contended that the movie
undermined her hard-won respectability and good name.47 The court upheld the
plaintiff‘s privacy claim, finding that she had a right to pursue safety and
happiness without such publicity.48
38.
39.

Eastman, 206 A.2d at 242.

144 (2009). The court found that the landlord‘s use of a peeping Tom device
raised a valid invasion of privacy claim. Eastman, 206 A.2d at 242. As Frederick Lane notes,
however, on remand, the jury sided with the landlord, seemingly accepting his explanation that he
did not install the device for ―vicarious thrills‖ but instead to monitor the operation of a pump in
the plaintiffs‘ basement.
, supra, at 144.
40. Vassiliades v. Garfinckel‘s, 492 A.2d 580, 586 (D.C. 1985).
41. Id.
42. Id. The court upheld the patient‘s ―‗right of private personality and emotional
security.‘‖ Id. at 587 (quoting Afro-Am. Publ‘g Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1966)).
Similarly, after a magazine used a woman‘s picture to promote a story about sexual antics, the
woman testified that she was so upset that she ―felt like crawling in a hole and never coming out‖
and dreaded going back to work. Braun v. Flynt, 726 F.2d 245, 248 (5th Cir. 1984).
43. 297 P. 91 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931).
44. Id. at 91.
45. Id. Historian Lawrence Friedman provides fascinating insights about the Melvin case.
216–19 (2007). He contends that the woman had
not truly resurrected herself as she claimed. Id. at 218. Friedman explains: ―There is good
evidence that she was, in fact, as phony as a three dollar bill. A journalist in Arizona argues that
she was still working as a prostitute and a madam‖ and that ―[d]uring her lifetime she had several
husbands, but they had the distressing habit of turning up dead.‖ Id. at 218. For an insightful
review of Lawrence Friedman‘s book, see Neil M. Richards, Privacy and the Limits of History, 21
165 (2009) (reviewing
, supra).
46. Reid, 297 P. at 91.
47.
supra note 45, at 217.
48. Id. at 291. Similarly, a court upheld a privacy claim against a creditor who publicized
the plaintiff‘s debt because it undermined the plaintiff‘s reputation in the community. Trammell v.
Citizens News Co., 148 S.W.2d 708 (Ky. 1941).
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These types of emotional and reputational harms are alive and well today,
and they are, in many ways, far worse.49 While public disclosures of the past
were more easily forgotten, memory decay has largely disappeared.50 Because
search engines reproduce information cached online, people cannot depend
upon time‘s passage to alleviate reputational and emotional damage.51 Unlike
newspapers, which were once only easily accessible in libraries after their
publication, search engines now index all content on the web, and can produce
it instantaneously. The Internet thus ensures that damaging personal
information is not forgotten, evoking a Nietzschean image of persistent
memory:
What if some day or night a demon were to steal into your loneliest
loneliness and say to you: ‗This life as you now live it and have lived it
you will have to live once again and innumerable times again;‘ . . . .
Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse
the demon who spoke thus?52
The Internet guarantees a Nietzschean ―eternal return‖ of damaging
disclosures.53
Consider these examples. A stalker spied on sports reporter Erin Andrews
at a hotel, secretly taping her while she undressed in her hotel room.54 He
posted over ten videos of her online.55 Google Trends data suggested that just
after the release of the videos, much of the nation began looking for some
variation on ―Erin Andrews peephole video.‖56 Nearly nine months later, Ms.
Andrews explained: ―‗I haven‘t stopped being victimized—I‘m going to have
to live with this forever. . . . When I have kids and they have kids, I‘ll have to
explain to them why this is on the Internet.‘‖57 She further lamented that when
she walks into football stadiums to report on a game, she faces the taunts of
fans who have seen her naked online.58 She explained that she ―‗felt like [she]

49.
supra note 20.
50.
9 (2009).
51.
supra note 20, at 74.
52.
194 (Bernard Williams ed., Josefine
Nauckoff trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2001) (1887); see
5 (Michael Henry Heim trans., 1984) (―In the world of eternal return the
weight of unbearable responsibility lies heavy in every move we make.‖).
53. Friedrich Nietzsche wrote of the concept of eternal return, which posits that the
universe has been recurring, and will continue to recur as we once experienced it, an infinite
number of times.
, supra note 52, at 341.
54. Leslie Casimir, The ESPN Girl Takes a Stand,
, Apr. 2010, at 161.
55. Lynn Lamanivong, Erin Andrews‘ Video Voyeur Gets 2½ Years,
Mar. 15, 2010,
http://www.conn.com/2010/CRIME/03/15/espn.erin.andrews.sentence/index.html.
56. Steve Johnson, Erin Andrews Nude Video Coverage Full of Hypocrisy,
., July
23, 2009, http://www.chicagotribune.com/features/yearinreview/chi-0723-espn-andrewsjul23,0,34
10514.column.
57. Casimir, supra note 54, at 162.
58. Id.
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was continuing to be victimized‘‖ each time she talked about it.59
When a woman named Amy was four years old, her uncle videotaped his
rape of her.60 Although Amy‘s uncle was arrested and jailed when Amy was
nine, causing the sexual abuse to stop, the photographs and videos of the sexual
abuse had already been circulated on the Internet.61 Those images are now the
most widely distributed child pornography of all time.62 Amy, who is now
twenty years old, testified that: ―‗[e]very day of my life, I live in constant fear
that someone will see my pictures, recognize me and that I will be humiliated
all over again.‘‖63
These cases exemplify the permanent emotional and reputational damage
that online disclosures can produce. Targeted individuals suffer anxiety and
shame every time they see the postings and learn that others have seen them.
For instance, the searchable, permanent nature of the Internet ensures that Amy
must grapple with the pain of her sexual abuse more than ten years after it
occurred. And employers may not want to get involved with people such as Ms.
Andrews, who come with publicized baggage.64
In short, individuals now must live with digital records of their lives that
are deeply humiliating and reputation-harming, as well as searchable and
accessible from anywhere, and by anyone, in the world.65 Often, the
information is taken out of context, producing a distorted and damaging view
of the person. Daniel Solove calls these privacy-invading online disclosures
―digital scarlet letters.‖66
B. Financial Injuries Multiplied
In the past, privacy invasions cost people work and clients. For instance,
the disclosure of a person‘s debts may have resulted in an employer‘s refusal to
hire him or a potential client‘s decision to work with another person. While
this, of course, remains true today, such individuals now suffer other kinds of
financial injuries as well. Following are examples of the broadening scope of
financial injuries faced by victims of privacy invasion.
Business entities, government agencies, and other actors collect massive
databases of sensitive personal information, such as Social Security numbers
(SSNs), biometric images, and medical data, to identify employees, facilitate

59. Michael Y. Park, Erin Andrews Calls Peeping-Tom Video a ‗Nightmare‘,
1, 2009, http://www.people.com/people/article/0,,20301731,00.html.
60. Susan Donaldson James, ‗Misty Series‘ Haunts Girl Long After Rape,
8, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=9773590.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Citron, Law‘s Expressive Value, supra note 23, at 397.
65.
supra note 20, at 76.
66. Id.

, Sept.
, Feb.
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instant credit, report payroll taxes, and administer health care.67 Because
databases of sensitive personal information are treasure troves for criminals,
data-security breaches are increasingly prevalent.68 Malicious computer
hackers, corrupt insiders, and careless employees cause the data leaks that
make these breaches possible.69 Accordingly, from 2005 to 2009, over 341
million records of sensitive personal information were involved in security
breaches in the United States.70
Data leaks lead to identity theft and fraud, which cause a host of problems
for their victims. Identity thieves use SSNs and biometric data to empty bank
accounts, exhaust others‘ credit card limits, secure loans, and flip property.71
Such thieves can destroy people‘s credit, precluding their ability to borrow
money.72 Other identity thieves use stolen health insurance information to
obtain health care, leaving individuals with hefty hospital bills and someone
else‘s treatment records.73 Identity theft can undermine individuals‘ ability to
obtain employment, because employers assess individuals‘ credit reports in
making hiring decisions.74 Some individuals can repair their credit reports, but
only after spending, on average, over $5,720.75 Others, however, may lack the
knowledge and means to repair their credit reports. They may be unable to take
out loans and get insurance, and might even face financial ruin.
The mere prevalence of identity theft today causes people to incur
financial costs even without experiencing identity theft. They expend time and
money to monitor their credit, distracting them from their jobs to their financial
detriment.76 Individuals pay for identity theft insurance, which, nonetheless,

67. Citron, Reservoirs of Danger, supra note 19.
68. Id. at 251.
69. Id. at 248.
70. A Chronology of Data Breaches,
,
http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm#2009 (last updated Oct. 18, 2010).
71. John Leland & Tom Zeller Jr., Technology and Easy Credit Give Identity Thieves an
Edge,
, May 30, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/30/us/30identity.html.
72. According to a Javelin Strategy & Research study, the incidence of identity theft
jumped sharply in 2008, up 22% from the prior year. Over 9.9 million people fell victim to
criminals who used their identifying information to impersonate them for financial gain. Danielle
Citron, Thinking Hard About the Privacy Risks of E-Health Records Systems,
(Feb. 9, 2009, 9:37 EST), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/02/
thinking_hard_a.html.
73. Margaret Collins, Stealing Your Identity for Liposuction,
, at 60, Apr.
19, 2010; see also
117 (2003).
74. Daniel J. Solove, The New Vulnerability: Data Security and Personal Information 9
(GWU Law School Public Law Research, Paper No. 102, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=583483.
75.
78 (2009); Daniel B. Prieto, Data Mine: Stopping Identity Theft,
, Dec. 19, 2005, at 17.
76. Citron, Reservoirs of Danger, supra note 19, at 253.
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often fails to reimburse the full costs if identity theft arises.77
Website operators have also raised individuals‘ risk of identity theft by
posting SSNs online for thieves to use. In City of Kirkland v. Sheehan,78
operators of a website critical of law enforcement personnel listed the SSNs of
officers on their site.79 In enforcing the plaintiffs‘ privacy claim, the court
explained that SSNs allow others to ―control, manipulate, or alter other
personal information.‖80
Financial harms can even arise from more benign uses of digital
information. Information brokers amass digital dossiers on individuals that
include incomplete and misleading data, selling them to potential employers
and costing individuals jobs.81 In most instances, these individuals have no idea
that such digital dossiers have cost them work opportunities.82 Individuals
featured therein also cannot force data brokers to disclose or correct those
dossiers.
These financial injuries have much in common with economic harm long
redressed under other branches of tort law. For example, when defendants
misrepresent information related to business deals, plaintiffs can recover for
economic harm caused by the defendant‘s lies.83 Likewise, plaintiffs can
recover for financial losses when defendants intentionally or negligently
interfere with individuals‘ prospective or current business relationships.84 The
financial injuries caused by misrepresentation and interference with business
relations resemble the economic losses suffered by individuals whose
information has been released into the hands of identity thieves and whose jobs
are lost due to false information generated by data brokers.
77. Id.; see Chuck Jaffe, Stupid Investment of the Week: Identity-Theft Insurance Isn‘t Even
Worth Its Small Price,
, Dec. 5, 2006, http://www.marketwatch.com/story.
Industry experts note that Consumer Reports finds that identity theft insurance has little value due
to its high deductibles. Richard G. Clarke, Is ID Theft Insurance Worth Recommending to Agency
Clients?,
, Oct. 9, 2008, http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2008/10/09/94495.
htm?print=1.
78. No. 01-2-09513-7 SEA, 2001 WL 1751590 (Wash. Sup. Ct. May 10, 2001).
79. Id.
80. Id. at *6.
81.
(2004) [hereinafter
].
82. Only in the exceptional case do people discover that their digital dossiers contain
incomplete and misleading information about them. For instance, in 2009, data broker
ChoicePoint provided an employer with a dossier on a Georgia man that falsely asserted that he
had two felony convictions. Your Bottom Line: Protecting Your Privacy (CNN television
broadcast Oct. 3, 2009), available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0910/03/
ybl.01.html (transcript). The employer refused to hire the man and explained the reason to him. Id.
A congressman from Georgia was able to convince ChoicePoint to remove the false criminal
information from his dossier. Id.
83.
, supra note 8, at § 110. For instance, plaintiffs have recovered for
economic losses suffered after investing in a bankrupt automobile agency based on false
assurances of profits. Hanson v. Ford Motor Co., 278 F.2d 586 (8th Cir. 1960).
84.
, supra note 8, at §§ 129, 130.

2010]

MAINSTREAMING PRIVACY TORTS

1817

C. Physical Injuries Exacerbated
In the past, physical injuries associated with privacy invasions typically
involved a person‘s physical manifestations of emotional distress. For instance,
individuals often suffered sleeplessness in the face of privacy invasions.85
Today, the physical harm associated with information disclosures can become
as serious as murder. For example, in Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc.,86 a
disturbed man obsessed with Amy Boyer purchased her Social Security number
and work address from information broker Docusearch.87 The stalker
confronted Ms. Boyer at work and killed her.88
In a similar vein, website operators facilitate physical assaults by exposing
personal information online. In 1997, an anti-abortion group hosted a website
called the Nuremberg Files, which provided a detailed profile of abortion
providers.89 This was part of a campaign by a group to terrorize abortion
doctors.90 The website included data on more than two hundred individuals,
including their names, home addresses, photographs, driver‘s license numbers,
SSNs, and information about family members—such as the schools their
children attended.91 It listed in grey the names of doctors who had been
wounded and put a line through the names of doctors who had been
murdered.92 After the website‘s creation, two abortion doctors were shot at
their homes.93 In 1998, an abortion clinic in Alabama was bombed and another
doctor killed by sniper fire at his home in New York.94 Immediately afterwards,
the website put a strike through the deceased doctor‘s name.95
In other cases, website operators have hosted ―advertisements‖ of
women‘s home addresses and their purported interest in rape fantasies, which
in at least one case led to the rape and assault of a woman.96 In early December
2009, an advertisement on Craigslist listed a picture of a woman, her home
address, and her alleged ―need‖ for a ―real aggressive man with no concern for
women.‖97 The advertisement was posted by the woman‘s ex-boyfriend.98 It
prompted a man to show up at the woman‘s front door, assault and rape the

85. See note 37 and accompanying text (discussing relevant cases).
86. 816 A.2d 1001 (N.H. 2003).
87. Id. at 1005–06.
88. Id.
89.
, supra note 20, at 100.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 101.
95. Id.
96. Neary, supra note 20; DeeDee Correll, Craigslist Implicated in Rape Case; A Wyoming
Man is Accused of Using the Website to Engineer an Ex-Girlfriend‘s Assault,
, Jan. 11,
2010, at A9.
97. Neary, supra note 20.
98. Id.

1818

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98:1805

woman, and leave her bound and gagged on the floor.99 The assailant claimed
that he did so at the invitation of the woman‘s advertisement and thought he
was fulfilling her rape fantasy.100 Although Craigslist had taken the posting
down after the woman complained, it remained up long enough for the assailant
to see it.101
A similar incident involving Craigslist occurred in August 2009. A
Craigslist‘s Casual Encounters102 listing included a posting of a teenager‘s
picture, work address, cell phone number, and email address.103 The listing
suggested that the young woman had rape fantasies.104 Immediately thereafter,
men called the teenager, flooded her email inbox with messages containing
pornography, and confronted her as she left work.105 In the same vein, in 2009,
a Long Island, New York, mother allegedly posted an advertisement on
Craigslist seeking sex and directing men to the mother of her nine-year-old
daughter‘s rival.106
In an early case of online impersonation, a security guard pretended to be
a woman in a chat room, claiming that the woman wanted to be assaulted. 107
The chat room posting asserted: ―I want you to break down my door and rape
me.‖108 It also provided the woman‘s name, address, and instructions about
how to get past her building‘s security system.109 Over the next few weeks,
nine men showed up at her door, often in the middle of the night.110
The physical harm that website operators and data brokers facilitate
resembles the physical injuries that result when landlords fail to secure their

99. Correll, supra note 96 (recounting court testimony that the man allegedly said to the
victim ―I‘ll show you aggressive‖ before he attacked her).
100. Id.
101. Neary, supra note 20.
102. Users post their information on the Casual Encounters section of Craigslist to arrange
consensual sexual encounters. See Douglas Quenqua, Recklessly Seeking Sex on Craigslist,
, Apr. 19, 2009, at ST1 (―Although sex is solicited online in many places—legally and
otherwise—the Casual Encounters listings are a major hub, offering to do for casual sex what the
rest of the site does for no-fee apartments, temp jobs and old strollers.‖); Kashmir Hill, Using
Craigslist to Crowdsource Revenge,
(June 1, 2010, 7:43 AM), http://trueslant.com/
KashmirHill/2010/06/01/using-craigslist-to-crowdsource-revenge/ (―For those who don‘t regularly
surf Craigslist to make personal connections, ‗casual encounters‘ is an area usually frequented by
those interested in one-off sexual adventures with strangers.‖).
103. Mo. Woman Charged with Cyberbullying Teen,
, Aug. 18, 2009,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/08/18/tech/main5249367.shtml.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Correll, supra note 96.
107.
249–51 (2008);
, available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/
cyberstalking.htm (Report from the Attorney General to the Vice President).
108.
, supra note 107, at 250.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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property.111 Data brokers and website operators exercise control over, and have
the ability to secure, information they host much as landlords do for their
buildings‘ common areas.
Contemporary privacy injuries are worse and more widespread than those
of the past. As modern technology becomes more integrated with our society,
these injuries last longer and invade more areas of people‘s lives. The next Part
explores the interests that privacy tort law protects and its limitations in the
face of these injuries.
II.
THE EVOLUTION OF PRIVACY TORT LAW
This Part begins by sketching Warren and Brandeis‘s vision of the privacy
tort and the interests that it protected. For Warren and Brandeis, the tort secured
people‘s ability to limit access to themselves and to determine the amount of
personal information revealed to others and, in this way, to develop their
personalities without interference. This Part also explores how Prosser shifted,
and ultimately narrowed, the privacy tort‘s development with his blend of
doctrine and policymaking. Finally, this Part explains why the privacy torts
often fail to prevent and remedy twenty-first century privacy problems.
A. Warren and Brandeis‘s Right to Be ―Let Alone‖
In 1890, Warren and Brandeis called for a tort to protect a person‘s ―right
to privacy,‖ a right to be free from the prying eyes and ears of others.112 They
sought to protect a person‘s personality from societal and technological
developments that saw no boundary.113 They argued that such a tort would
tackle the problem of ―[i]nstantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise[s]
[that had] invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life.‖114 Such
―political, social, and economic‖ change interfered with people‘s ability to

111. See Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 480–81 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (finding landlord liable where a poorly secured building resulted in tenants‘ physical
beating at the hands of criminals); Novak v. Capital Mgmt. & Dev. Corp., 452 F.3d 902 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (holding that a club operator had a duty to use reasonable care in protecting patrons from
danger of attack in an alley because operators controlled the alley and knew about prior criminal
conduct there).
112. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195. The story behind the writing of The Right to
Privacy is illuminating. The penny press actively covered the domestic social engagements of
Samuel Warren and his wife Mabel Bayard, who was the daughter of a U.S. Senator.
97 (2010). Warren had a ―deepseated abhorrence‖ for the
society pages, which prompted him to recruit his law partner Brandeis to coauthor The Right to
Privacy. Neil M. Richards, The Puzzle of Brandeis, Privacy, and Speech, 63
. 1295,
1302 (2010) (contending that Warren and Brandeis wanted to protect elites from the unwanted
gaze of social inferiors while shoring up traditional Gilded Age notions of gender roles and the
―cult of domesticity.‖).
113.
, supra note 112, at 100.
114. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195.
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determine how their private lives are portrayed to the public.115 In Warren and
Brandeis‘ view, the common law secured the right to determine ―to what extent
[one‘s] thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to
others.‖116 Thus, the privacy tort would prevent the publication of a person‘s
private life from ―being depicted at all.‖117
Warren and Brandeis argued that tort law should protect the privacy of the
individual from ―invasion either by the too enterprising press, the photographer,
or the possessor of any other modern device for recording or reproducing
scenes or sounds.‖118 They believed that without a cause of action for privacy
breaches, society might sacrifice its ―robustness of thought and delicacy of
feeling.‖119 As Randall Bezanson explained, Warren and Brandeis gave a legal
definition to the boundary between the public and the private—―between
occasions when personal information should be the business of others and
occasions when it should be no one else‘s affair.‖120
The Right to Privacy offered a distinct view of the privacy tort‘s legally
protected interest. The tort of privacy protected individuals‘ ability to develop
their ―inviolate‖ personalities without unwanted interference from prying
eyes.121 It preserved people‘s ability to decide how much of themselves and
their personal information would be revealed to others.122 As Warren and
Brandeis underscored, privacy invasions injured a person‘s ―estimate of
himself.‖123 They inflicted ―mental pain and distress, far greater than could be
inflicted by mere bodily injury.‖124
Warren and Brandeis explained that the ―harm wrought by such
invasions‖ was not ―confined to the suffering of those who may be made the
subjects of journalistic or other enterprise.‖125 For them, ―[e]ven gossip
apparently harmless, when widely and persistently circulated, is potent for evil‖
in its ability to ―belittle the relative importance of things.‖126 According to
Edward Bloustein, Warren and Brandeis envisioned the privacy tort as
protecting an individual‘s ―independence, dignity, and integrity‖—for them,
determining how much of oneself to reveal to others ―define[d] man‘s essence

115. Id. at 196.
116. Id. at 198.
117. Id. at 218.
118. Id. at 206.
119. Id. at 196.
120. Randall P. Bezanson, The Right to Privacy Revisited: Privacy, News, and Social
Change, 1890-1990, 80
1133, 1135 (1992). In many respects, the line between
public and private was far easier to identify in the late nineteenth century than it is today.
121. Id. at 17.
122. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 213.
123. Id. at 197.
124. Id. at 196.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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as a unique and self-determining being.‖127
Shortly after the publication of The Right to Privacy, courts adopted
privacy torts in the manner that Warren and Brandeis suggested.128 In 1905, the
Supreme Court of Georgia recognized a privacy tort claim in a case involving
the non-consensual use of the plaintiff‘s picture in a newspaper
advertisement.129 Invoking Warren and Brandeis‘s article, the court enforced
the plaintiff‘s claim, finding that special damages were not necessary to state a
cause of action because an infringement on privacy ―is a direct invasion of a
legal right.‖130 The court noted that the ―right of privacy‖ secures a person‘s
―right to live as one will.‖131 As the court underscored, privacy tort law
protected a person‘s ―desire to live a life of seclusion‖ or to ―live a life of
privacy as to certain matters, and of publicity as to others.‖132 By 1911, courts
and legislatures in nine states recognized some version of Warren and
Brandeis‘s ―right to privacy.‖133 In recognizing privacy claims, courts
underscored that the privacy tort protected one‘s ―inviolate personality.‖134
B. Prosser‘s Blend of Social Engineering and Doctrine
Seventy years after The Right to Privacy‘s publication, Prosser engaged in
work that changed the trajectory of privacy tort law. As the Reporter for the
Second Restatement of Torts and as a scholar, Prosser deemphasized tort
privacy‘s protection of a person‘s right to be ―let alone‖ and instead focused on
the conduct and injuries involved in privacy invasions.135 He argued that
privacy tort law protected against four types of activities and the emotional,
reputational, and proprietary injuries that they inflicted.136 Prosser‘s approach
grew out of his desire to redress and prevent injuries and to honor precedent in
a manner that would prevent the privacy tort from bleeding into other torts.
While Prosser ―gave privacy a doctrinal unity and continuity that it had not
127.
10 (2003).
128. Edward Bloustein pointed to numerous cases that use Warren and Brandeis‘s
conceptualization of the tort of privacy in upholding a privacy claim. Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy
as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39
. 962, 977, 979
(1964).
129. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 68–69 (Ga. 1905); see, e.g., AfroAm. Publ‘g Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649, 654 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (recognizing an invasion of privacy
claim based on Warren and Brandeis‘s article as vindicating the right of private personality, the
right to be let alone, which stands on ―high ground, cognate to the values and concerns protected
by constitutional guarantees‖).
130. Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 73.
131. Id. at 70.
132. Id.
133. Benjamin E. Bratman, Brandeis and Warren‘s ‗The Right to Privacy and the Birth of
the Right to Privacy‘, 69
. 623, 643 (2002).
134. Mau v. Rio Grande Oil, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 845, 846 (N.D. Cal. 1939).
135. Prosser, supra note 8, at 392–400.
136. Id.;
829–42 (3d ed. 1964)
[hereinafter
3d].
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previously possessed,‖137 he also narrowed its reach.
Prosser‘s interest in policymaking led him to suggest an approach to tort
law driven by particular harms. Generally speaking, Prosser saw tort law as
―social engineering,‖ or the adjustment of ―conflicting interests of individuals
to achieve a desirable social result.‖138 He recommended that judges resolve
tort cases in the way that would produce the ―greatest happiness of the greatest
number.‖139 For Prosser, tort law should prevent and remedy losses caused by
antisocial conduct.140 To that end, Prosser organized torts around injuries
caused by particular hazards.141
Oliver Wendell Holmes exemplified this harm-based approach.142 In The
Common Law, Holmes explained that the evil against which tort law was
directed was the inflicting of harm.143 Tort law protected against harms and
remedied them ―‗not because they [were] wrong, but because they [were]
harms.‘‖144 Holmes sought to strike a balance between the social interests in
preventing the infliction of harm and in protecting freedom of action.145
In categorizing the privacy torts, Prosser emulated Holmes‘s focus on
specific injuries caused by particular conduct. As Diane Zimmerman observed,
Prosser‘s privacy taxonomy conformed to the Holmesian model of focusing on
law‘s compensatory function.146 But, in doing so, Prosser identified the injuries
suffered quite narrowly. He envisioned the privacy torts‘ legally protected
interest as a person‘s freedom from emotional distress, damaged reputation, and
proprietary harm caused by the four types of privacy-invasive activities that
became his privacy taxonomy.147 For instance, he explained that a defendant‘s

137.
, supra note 21, at 173.
138.
§ 3, at 15 (1st ed. 1941)
[hereinafter
1st].
139. Id. at 17.
140. Id. at 15, 17.
141.
, supra note 21, at 176. As Richard Markovits observed, Prosser believed that
judges should operate as goal-oriented policymakers rather than identifying ―unique answers that
are right as a matter of law.‖ Richard S. Markovits, Liberalism and Tort Law: On the Content of
the Corrective-Justice-Securing Tort Law of a Liberal, Rights-Based Society, 2006
.
243, 293 (describing important contemporary tort scholars and judges, such as Fleming James,
Roger Traynor, and William Prosser, as moral skeptics interested in social engineering).
142.
339 (2001). Torts scholar Thomas C.
Grey vividly describes Holmes‘s harm-based approach in his article Accidental Torts, 54
. 1225 (2001).
143.
64 (1881, reissued 1963).
144. Thomas C. Grey, Accidental Torts, 54
. 1225, 1272 (2001) (quoting
Holmes, supra note 143, at 144) (emphasis added).
145. Id. at 1272. Grey categorized ordinary activities warranting negligence and extra
hazardous ones warranting strict liability.
128 (1995).
146. Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Musings on a Famous Law Review Article: The Shadow
of Substance, 41
. 823, 825 (1991).
147. Id. Reviewing Prosser‘s 1941 treatise, Laurence Eldredge explains that while Prosser
treated mental distress claims separately from privacy claims, the ―interest invaded in the privacy
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intrusion on another‘s seclusion interfered with that person‘s interest in being
free from emotional distress.148 For ―publicity of private facts‖ and ―false light‖
claims, ―[t]he interest protected is that of reputation, with the same overtones of
mental distress that are present in libel and slander.‖149
Prosser based privacy tort law‘s legally protected interest on his analysis
of precedent. In that sense, his approach owed much to his doctrinal
instincts.150 Prosser classified, catalogued, and synthesized reported decisions
to reveal general rules.151 Based on the cases, Prosser identified four types of
privacy-impairing activities: (1) unreasonable intrusion upon a person‘s
seclusion, (2) appropriation of someone‘s name or likeness, (3) unreasonably
giving publicity to a person‘s private life, and (4) publicizing someone in a
false light.152 He based those rules on well-established precedent because, in his
view, judges take comfort in steering according to the ―magnetic needle of stare
decisis.‖153
G. Edward White aptly described Prosser‘s methodology as ―Consensus
Thought.‖154 While Prosser collected cases, rationalized results, and stated
general rules, he balanced the interests at stake and focused on injuries worthy
of prevention and compensation.155 As Craig Joyce explained, Prosser
acknowledged and identified the ―various interests to be balanced, while
relentlessly asserting (and, by copious citations and deceptively simple
illustrations, seeming to prove) that the results of the cases, on proper analysis,
were but multiple, somewhat varied yet ultimately consistent examples of

cases is the interest in freedom from mental distress.‖ Book Review, 90
505, 506
(1942).
148. Prosser, supra note 8, at 392 (explaining that the ―interest protected by [the intrusion]
tort is primarily a mental one‖ useful to fill the gaps left by trespass, nuisance, and the intentional
infliction of mental distress and whatever remedies there may be for the invasion of constitutional
rights).
149. Id. at 398. Prosser‘s view of the injuries that the privacy torts protected against
developed over time. In 1941, Prosser saw the tort of privacy as part ―of the larger problem of the
protection of the plaintiff‘s peace of mind against unreasonable disturbance.‖
1st, supra note 138 § 107, at 1053–54. Indeed, Prosser suggested that if the ―‗new
tort‘ of the intentional infliction of mental suffering receives general recognition, the great
majority of the privacy cases may be expected to be absorbed into it.‖ Id. In his Privacy article
and as the Reporter on the Second Restatement of Torts, Prosser expanded his description of
privacy injuries to include reputational and proprietary harms. Prosser, supra note 8, at 400-01;
§ 652H (1977).
150. See Neil Richards & Daniel Solove, Prosser‘s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98
1887 (2010) [hereinafter Richards & Solove, Prosser‘s Privacy Law] (discussing
Prosser‘s doctrinalism).
151.
, supra note 21, at 158; Craig Joyce, Keepers of the Flame: Prosser and Keeton
on the Law of Torts (Fifth Edition) and the Prosser Legacy, 39
851, 860 (1986).
152. Prosser, supra note 8; Prosser,
3d, supra note 136, at 829–42.
153. William L. Prosser, Book Review, 16
. 222, 223 (1932) (reviewing
,
(1927)).
154
, supra note 21, at 176.
155. Joyce, supra note 151, at 892.
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Prosser‘s own general rules.‖156 In this way, Prosser fused the insights of
instrumentalists, who emphasized the possibilities of social engineering, with
the ―countervailing demands‖ of doctrinally oriented scholars who sought
predictability in the law.157
Anita Bernstein argues that Prosser‘s blend of doctrine and policymaking
was crucial to his privacy taxonomy‘s success.158 According to Bernstein,
Prosser‘s reform-minded agenda needed precedent to thrive.159 While Prosser‘s
focus on the remedy and prevention of harm gave the privacy torts ―intellectual
legitimacy,‖ his reliance on case law ―reassured onlookers that their measure
would not go out of control.‖160 Bernstein contends that because tort
innovations had long been treated with suspicion and panic, Prosser wisely
invoked doctrine to make a case for the privacy torts.161 Bernstein described
Prosser as ―better than anyone at the job of making a new tort look
conservative.‖162 The ―combination of two opposing jurisprudential postures
permitted new torts to form‖ without being labeled as such.163
Prosser‘s privacy taxonomy now permeates case law.164 Its classifications
have taken on the status of doctrine.165 The 1971 edition of the Prosser
hornbook proudly noted that ―as yet no decided case allowing recovery‖ in
privacy had occurred ―which does not fall fairly within one of the four
categories.‖166 This remains true today: Prosser‘s taxonomy now ―supplant[s]
Warren and Brandeis‘s work as the touchstone of privacy jurisprudence.‖167
C. The Legacy of Prosser‘s Privacy Taxonomy
In spite of its dominance in tort law, Prosser‘s privacy taxonomy is a
double-edged sword. Although it provided a pragmatic response to twentiethcentury privacy intrusions, it leaves many contemporary privacy injuries
uncompensated.168
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Anita Bernstein, The New-Tort Centrifuge, 49
. 413, 418–20 (1999).
159. Id. at 418.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 419.
162. Id. at 423.
163. Id. at 420.
164.
, supra note 21, at 430.
165. Id. at 158. Aside from Prosser‘s contribution in getting judges to recognize the four
privacy torts, his other lasting accomplishments include his support for, and clarification of, the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress as well as strict products liability. See William L.
Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37
. 874 (1939).
166.
§ 117 at 816 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter
4th].
167. Jonathan Kahn, Bringing Dignity Back to Light: Publicity Rights and the Eclipse of
the Tort of Appropriation of Identity, 17
213, 223 (1999).
168. Richards & Solove, Prosser‘s Privacy Law, supra note 150, at 1918 (discussing the
failure of privacy tort law to ―adapt[] to new privacy problems such as the extensive collection,
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Part of the problem can be attributed to Prosser‘s restrictive conception of
the privacy torts‘ legally protected interest. Whereas Warren and Brandeis
sought to protect an individual‘s right to be ―let alone‖ from unwanted
disclosure and intrusion, Prosser saw privacy tort law as protecting a person
from emotional, reputational, and proprietary harm caused by specific
activities. This narrowed the reach of the privacy torts from an approach that
could adapt to changing circumstances to one that addressed four narrow types
of privacy-invasive activities and their accompanying injuries. Importantly, it
stopped courts from fleshing out the contours of the ―right to be let alone‖
protected by tort privacy.
Courts adopted Prosser‘s privacy taxonomy with such rigidity that privacy
tort law is now locked into a ―writ system.‖169 Courts recognize the four
privacy torts but only those privacy torts.170 Legal forms naturally tend to shape
our thinking,171 and Prosser‘s prestige and work on the Second Restatement of
Torts additionally ensured the adoption of this constricted approach.172 Privacy
torts have taken on a ―quasi-legislative prescription of the bounds of future
liability for invasions of privacy.‖173 At the same time, courts have narrowly
construed the elements of the four privacy torts, further limiting their reach.
This is surely due to the concern that privacy claimants could recover for
trivialities given the ethereal nature of the alleged harm.174
In its current state, Prosser‘s privacy taxonomy plays a limited role in
tackling many contemporary privacy injuries.175 As this Part shows, some
use, and disclosure of personal information by businesses‖).
169. David W. Leebron, The Right to Privacy‘s Place in the Intellectual History of Tort
Law, 41
. 808 (1991); White, supra note 21, at 176.
170.
,
9.6A 3d ed. 2006).
171. Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61
. 136 (1992); Jay M. Feinman,
The Jurisprudence of Classification, 41
. 661 (1989).
172. Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy‘s Other Path: Recovering the Law of
Confidentiality, 96
. 123, 153 (2008) [hereinafter Richards & Solove, Privacy‘s Other
Path]. As Harry Kalven presciently noted in 1966: ―given the deserved Prosser prestige, it is a
safe prediction that the fourfold view will come to dominate whatever thinking is done about the
right of privacy in the future.‖ Kalven, supra note 24, at 332.
173.
supra note 170, 9.6A 3d ed. 2006).
174. See Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and
Brandeis‘s Privacy Tort, 68
291, 324 (1983) (arguing that recovery in privacy
tort based solely or largely on claimed psychological harm ―hardly rests on firm legal ground‖
because injuries are difficult to measure); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Prying, Spying, and Lying:
Intrusive Newsgathering and What the Law Should Do About It, 73
. 173, 211 (1998)
(attributing plaintiffs‘ limited success in bringing intrusion on seclusion claims to courts‘ hostility
to dignitary torts).
175. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52
1283, 1304 (2000) (―[A]s the literature has made very clear, the invasion of privacy tort is
too narrowly defined to serve.‖); Paul Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52
1607, 1634 (1999) (―Although the most likely place to begin a search for legal
safeguards is the tort law of privacy, it is of little help in cyberspace.‖); Jerry Kang, Information
Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50
1193, 1231 (1998) (―[T]he common law
tort of invasion of privacy has thus far provided no effective constraints on the sort of information
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privacy problems fall outside the four privacy torts. And while others may be
covered by the torts, their restrictive elements may preclude recovery.
1. Privacy Problems Falling Outside the Reach of the Privacy Torts
When Prosser constructed his taxonomy, privacy intrusions typically
involved information collected directly from individuals.176 Government and
businesses stored personal data in paper records, posing a limited threat to
individual privacy.177 By contrast, today‘s privacy problems often emerge from
the way that public and private entities handle and maintain personal data.178
Because Prosser‘s taxonomy addressed privacy invasions characteristic of prior
eras, and because courts applied it rigidly, privacy torts often do not prevent or
redress many contemporary privacy injuries involving the collection and
disclosure of personal information.
For example, privacy torts may not redress injuries resulting from
insecure databases of sensitive personal information.179 In public disclosure
suits, plaintiffs must show that the defendants widely publicized the personal
information:180 communication of data to a single individual or a small group of
people is insufficient.181 Courts likely would not recognize public disclosure
claims for the leaking of sensitive information to identity thieves, or for the
release of distorted digital dossiers to employers, because only a small number
of people—hackers—sees the sensitive personal information.182
flows depicted above.‖).
176.
, supra note 15, at 189.
177. The first federal agencies to use mainframe computers for storage and computation
purposes—the Social Security Administration, the Census Bureau, and the Internal Revenue
Service—began doing so in the mid-to-late 1950s.
, supra note 39, at 138. When Prosser
wrote his seminal article Privacy and worked on the Second Restatement of Torts in the early
1960s, computers still had not replaced paper files for general government recordkeeping. Id. at
138–39. The migration to computerized files began in earnest in the late 1960s. Id.
178.
, supra note 15, at 189.
179. See Richards & Solove, Privacy‘s Other Path, supra note 172, at 155 (discussing the
various ways that the privacy torts fail to address problems related to the collection, processing,
and disclosure of information); see also
supra note 81; Neil M.
Richards, The Information Privacy Law Project, 94
1087 (2006); Daniel J. Solove,
Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53
. 1393 (2001). Michael Rustad and Thomas Koenig note a variety of areas where courts have
failed to address twenty-first century privacy problems, including the online publication of
disciplinary actions where the information is part of a public record and the widespread
surveillance of employees‘ Internet use in the workplace. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H.
Koenig, Cybertorts and Legal Lag: An Empirical Analysis, 13
. 77, 129–30
(2004).
180.
§ 652D cmt. a (1977) (―it is not an invasion of the
right of privacy . . . to communicate a fact concerning the plaintiff‘s private life to a single person
or even to a small group of persons‖).
181. Swinton Creek Nursery v. Edisto Farm Credit, 514 S.E.2d 126, 132 (1999).
182. See Bodah v. Lakeville Motor Express, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 550 (Minn. 2003) (finding
no publicity under disclosure tort, where defendant gave plaintiffs‘ Social Security numbers to
sixteen of its managers, because disclosure needs to be to the public at large). Disclosures of
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Moreover, plaintiffs probably cannot sue database operators for intrusion
on seclusion under current case law. To prevail in an intrusion suit, a plaintiff
must show that a defendant invaded his physical solitude or seclusion, such as
by entering his home, in a manner that would be highly offensive to the
reasonable person.183 Database operators and data brokers, however, never
intrude upon a plaintiff‘s private space. They do not gather information directly
from individuals and, to the extent that they do, the privacy problem involves
the failure to secure personal information, not its collection.184
Those harmed by database operators‘ failure to keep private information
secure likely do not have a false light claim either. False light claims require
proof of a plaintiff‘s placement in a false light.185 These claims do not apply
when, as here, leaked information causes mischief because it is true.186
Finally, appropriation claims are also insufficient to protect the rights of
individuals harmed by database leaks. Appropriation claims arise when a
defendant uses for his own benefit the name or likeness of another.187 In
leaking sensitive personal information, database operators do not use plaintiffs‘
name or image for their commercial advantage. Instead, database operators fail
to secure sensitive personal information from criminals.188 Appropriation
claims simply have no application to database operators who leak sensitive
personal information to identity thieves.
Other modern privacy problems also fall outside of the scope of Prosser‘s
taxonomy. Privacy tort law does not address website operators‘ display of
individuals‘ home addresses in ways that make them vulnerable to physical

personal data by data brokers also might not be considered ―highly offensive to the reasonable
person‖ as one‘s home address, finances, and shopping habits might not strike many as deeply
embarrassing or humiliating.
, supra note 81, at 60.
183.
4th, supra note 166, at 833.
184.
,
, supra note 15, at 189; see, e.g., Dwyer v.
American Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (dismissing intrusion on seclusion
claim where defendant rented lists of consumer behavior because defendant compiled the
information about plaintiffs from their own records and because plaintiffs freely gave that
information to defendant). To be sure, database operators may collect information from
individuals at the outset—businesses collect SSNs for a variety of reasons. The harm is not the
collection here but instead the failure to secure the information from criminals.
185.
4th, supra note 166, at 837.
186. False light claims could be invoked where data brokers reveal false or distorting
information to prospective employers as in the ChoicePoint matter discussed in Part I, if courts
found such activities highly offensive to the reasonable person. Because false light claims raise
free speech concerns, many courts refuse to recognize them. Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582
N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. 1998).
187.
§ 652C (1977); see
218 3d ed. 2008) (explaining that appropriation
protects against the ―commercial‖ exploitation of one‘s name or likeness).
188. See, e.g., Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1010 (N.H. 2003)
(dismissing appropriation claim against data broker who sold personal information to stalker
because data broker did not seek to take advantage of person‘s good will or reputation in using the
information).
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attack. For instance, plaintiffs cannot bring intrusion on seclusion claims in this
situation because online postings do not involve invasions of a place or
information that society recognizes as private. Website operators often cannot
be said to have used someone‘s image for their own commercial advantage or
to have put targeted individuals in a false light.189 Because postings often reveal
publicly available information such as a person‘s home address, courts likely
would not uphold disclosure claims against website operators on the grounds
that the disclosed information is not private.190
2. Precluding Recovery for Injuries Covered by the Privacy Torts
Prosser‘s taxonomy may also have limited value in cases that are covered
by the privacy torts. Generally speaking, plaintiffs have difficulty pursuing
privacy claims.191 A study found that from 1974 to 1984, plaintiffs prevailed in
2.8% of cases involving public disclosure claims against the media and in
twelve percent of cases involving non-media defendants.192 In intrusion actions,
plaintiffs succeeded in ten percent of cases against non-media defendants and
in three-eights of cases against media defendants.193 Plaintiffs recovered in onethird of cases where plaintiffs sued media and non-media defendants for
appropriation.194
Privacy tort claims‘ restrictive elements play a role in this disappointing
track record. Courts have long demanded considerable proof in privacy cases to
prevent recovery for trivialities.195 They routinely require plaintiffs to show that
defendant‘s conduct was ―highly offensive to the reasonable person.‖196 Courts

189. Website postings involving impersonations would implicate false light claims against
the posters themselves.
190. Richards & Solove, Prosser‘s Privacy Law, supra note 150, at 1919 (explaining that
disclosures of a person‘s home address would not satisfy the ―highly offensive to the reasonable
person‖ requirement of disclosure privacy tort). A small number of courts have, however, found
that individuals have a privacy interest in their home addresses. See, e.g., Nat‘l Ass‘n of Retired
Fed. Emps. v. Horner, 879 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (finding that individuals had privacy interest
in avoiding unlimited disclosure of their names and addresses); see also Benz v. Wash.
Newspaper Publ‘g Co., 2006 WL 2844896, at *8 (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 2006) (refusing to dismiss
public disclosure claim where defendant published plaintiff‘s home address, alongside her
suggested interest in sex, online because her home address was a private fact given that it was not
published elsewhere). Moreover, as the next Part addresses, section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act (CDA) affords website operators broad immunity for publishing the content of other
websites. See infra Part III.
191.
116 (1987).
192. Id.
193. Id. Aside from the study discussed in the Bezanson book, I know of no other
contemporary studies regarding the success rates of privacy claims.
194. Id.
195. Kalven, supra note 24 at 328.
196. Notably, the Restatement of Torts only required evidence that the defendant‘s
actions were ―offensive to persons of ordinary sensibilities.‖ § 867 cmt. d (1939). The Restatement
(Second) of Torts elevated it to ―highly offensive to a reasonable person.‖ § 652B (1977). Prosser
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insist upon proof of intentional conduct197 and regularly adopt a restrictive view
of what constitutes private information worthy of protection.198
Free speech concerns impact the efficacy of privacy torts as well. Courts
dismiss public disclosure claims where information addresses a newsworthy
matter, in other words, one of public concern.199 They often defer to the
media‘s judgment, all but guaranteeing the demise of plaintiffs‘ claims.200 The
Supreme Court has recognized the constitutional status of the newsworthiness
test, requiring heightened scrutiny for restrictions on certain disclosures of
public concern.201 For instance, in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,202 the
Supreme Court held that the press could not be sanctioned for publicizing true
information obtained from court documents open to public inspection.203 In
Florida Star v. B.J.F.,204 the Court reiterated this rule, concluding that the First
Amendment prohibited liability when a newspaper published the name of a
rape victim obtained from a police report.205 A recent Supreme Court decision,
however, recognized the possibility that privacy could trump newsworthiness
concerns in certain contexts, signaling a turn in favor of privacy against press
freedoms.206
On top of these obstacles, plaintiffs have difficulty recovering for their
emotional and reputational harm due to the privacy torts‘ restrictive

surely had something to do with this. In Privacy, he expressed dismay that privacy tort law did not
require proof of extreme outrage and serious mental harm as did intentional infliction of emotional
distress claims. Prosser, supra note 8, at 422. He argued that because privacy tort claims often
sought recovery for emotional distress, they should demand the same proof as intentional
infliction of emotional distress claims. Id.
197.
§ 652B (1977); Yoder v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 31
F. Supp. 2d 565 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (dismissing privacy claim arising from disclosure of plaintiff‘s
HIV status because the disclosure was not intentional).
198. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72
. 919
(2005).
199. Richards & Solove, Privacy‘s Other Path, supra note 172.
200. Id.
201. Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against
Disclosure, 53
. 967, 988–89 (2003).
202. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
203. Id. at 469–97. In a subsequent decision, the Court held that ―[i]f a newspaper lawfully
obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance then state officials may not
constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest of
the highest order.‖ Smith v. Daily Mail Publ‘g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979).
204. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
205. Id. at 533–37 (1989). The Supreme Court has also held that the First Amendment
required proof of actual malice in false light cases. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
206. Gajda, supra note 5, at 1079–80 (discussing Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 532
(2001), which cautioned that privacy concerns might trump the public‘s interest in newsworthy
matters in cases involving disclosures of ―domestic gossip or other information of purely private
concern‖). In her important work, Amy Gajda has explored how courts now defer less to the
media on questions of newsworthiness in a manner that poses serious free speech concerns. Gajda,
supra note 5, at 1072–76.
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elements.207 In the pre-Internet era, courts deemed disclosures of a person‘s
unflattering or unusual behavior as falling short of the ―highly offensive to a
reasonable person‖ standard. A court, for instance, found the revelation of a
body surfer‘s proclivity to put cigarettes out on his tongue and eat insects
―unflattering and perhaps embarrassing‖ but not sufficiently ―morbid and
sensational‖ to satisfy the ―very high level of offensiveness‖ required.208
Another court held that although publicity of a person‘s illegal parking in a
handicapped spot was ―unflattering,‖ it would not be ―highly offensive to the
reasonable person‖ because parking violations are an ―everyday occurrence
with which every driver must contend.‖209
Although those disclosures have failed to warrant redress in the past,
perhaps they should in the present. In our networked age, unflattering
information posted online can cause significant harm. What if someone today
posted information about a person‘s parking violations? Under current case
law, courts likely would not find such disclosure, if true, ―highly offensive to
the reasonable person‖ because it involves the ordinary, rather than the
sensational.210 Nonetheless, this disclosure, when repeatedly revealed to
professional and personal contacts, could produce emotional and reputational
damage equivalent to the harm experienced by those satisfying the ―highly
offensive‖ standard in the pre-Internet age. Revelations of people‘s unusual or
unappealing conduct may prominently appear in searches of their names, and
their explanations, if any, may be buried in less prominent posts. Prospective
employers and clients would see the embarrassing information without any
context.211 Online postings perpetuate a person‘s emotional suffering, muting
concerns that plaintiffs might recover for trivialities. This warrants
reconsideration of the privacy torts.212
In a similar vein, courts have narrowly interpreted the meaning of private
information in the public disclosure tort. As noted above, courts have refused to
207. Privacy tort law might have some success in cases resembling Erin Andrews‘
struggles. No doubt, the intrusions on Ms. Andrews‘s seclusion would be deemed ―highly
offensive to the reasonable person.‖ See supra text accompanying notes 54–59.
208. Virgil v. Sports Illustrated, 424 F. Supp. 1286, 1289 (S.D. Cal. 1976). The court
explained that because the article included plaintiff‘s ―retrospective, more mature, perception and
explanation‖ of the facts ―any negative impression‖ of the plaintiff was tempered by his own
remarks. Id.
209. Joyce v. Nextmedia Grp., Inc., No. 12617-2003, 13133-2003, 2004 WL 1932742, at
*6 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 12, 2004).
210. This may be particularly true in cases where the disclosures involve private facts that
other courts have determined fall short of the ―highly offensive‖ standard. See Cole v. CSC
Applied Tech., LLC, 2008 WL 2705458, at *2 (W.D. Okla. 2008).
211. This may be especially true of lurid postings, such as information about a person‘s
sexual habits, because they tend to attract attention from other sites and thus would appear
prominently in searches of a person‘s name.
212. Any potential solutions would not impact the free speech concerns that animate the
newsworthiness element of public disclosure claims. See supra notes 198–205 and accompanying
text.
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recognize privacy claims where defendants publicized a person‘s home
address.213 Nonetheless, the publication of a person‘s home address poses
serious risks. A restrictive approach to the disclosure tort seems unjustified in
light of the dangers facilitated by our networked environment as discussed in
Part I of this article. In short, the privacy torts often cannot properly redress
contemporary privacy injuries. The next part explores how mainstream tort
remedies can supply a means to protect important privacy interests.
III.
UPDATING PRIVACY TORT LAW FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
This Part offers potential strategies for ensuring privacy tort law‘s efficacy
in the information age.214 A promising approach is to update privacy tort law to
protect the broader set of interests that Warren and Brandeis identified in The
Right to Privacy. In so doing, courts could invoke mainstream tort tools to
address contemporary privacy problems.215 As Prosser understood with great
success, second-best solutions can be preferable to first-order ones that have
little chance of adoption.
This Part considers an extension of enablement and breach of confidence
law as well as the adoption of strict liability for abnormally dangerous
activities. This Part also contemplates strategies for ensuring the privacy torts‘
prevention and remedy of serious emotional and reputational injuries caused by
213. See supra note 187 and accompanying text (discussing how courts often do not
recognize public disclosure claims based on the release of home addresses because that
information is already in the public domain).
214. Either legislatures or courts could lead this effort. The question of which institution is
better suited to do so is beyond the scope of this Article. For thoughtful discussion of the
comparative competence of the legislature and judiciary to address emerging privacy problems,
see Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the
Case for Caution, 102
801, 806 (2004) (arguing that ―the legislative branch rather
than the judiciary should create the primary investigative rules when technology is changing‖); see
also Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr‘s Misguided Call for
Judicial Deference, 74
747 (2005) (positing that the judiciary is no less
competent to address privacy problems raised by emerging technologies than the legislature).
215. Recently proposed federal legislation does not offer support for the torts-focused
agenda articulated here. In June 2010, Representative Rick Boucher submitted for comment a
draft consumer privacy bill that proposed a ―notice and choice‖ regime for much of the private
sector‘s online and offline collection, use, and disclosure of personal information. Staff Discussion
Draft, May 3, 2010, http://www.boucher.house.gov/images/stories/Privacy_Draft_5-10.pdf; see
Danielle Citron, The Boucher Privacy Bill: A Little Something For Everyone yet Nothing for All?,
(June 13, 2010, 11:37 AM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/
archives/2010/06/the-boucher-privacy-bill-a-little-something-for-everyone-yet-nothing-forall.html (summarizing the key features of the Boucher bill). While providing notice and opt-out
consent for the collection, use, and sharing of information in certain instances, and notice and optin consent in others, the bill would preempt state law on the collection, use, or disclosure of
covered information and bar private rights of action as well. Omnibus privacy bills akin to the
Boucher proposal would cut off state-level innovation, including tort claims, without sufficient
privacy protections for consumers. Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118
.
902 (2009).
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networked technologies.
A. Mainstreaming Privacy Tort Law for the Twenty-First Century
The privacy torts‘ intellectual lineage provides important insights that
may be crucial to their future. Warren and Brandeis set forth the broader set of
interests protected by privacy tort law while Prosser demonstrated the wisdom
of combining theory and practice. Heeding both could help privacy tort law
adapt to meet the privacy problems of the digital age.
Our conception of privacy harm should include the interests addressed in
The Right to Privacy. Warren and Brandeis identified a normative idea of
privacy based on individuals‘ interest in constructing their identities and
personalities free from unwanted interference.216 They envisioned privacy tort
law as protecting a person‘s right to be ―let alone,‖ whether that meant
preventing someone from interfering with a person‘s solitude or precluding the
revelation of personal information to others.217 Their understanding of privacy
included a person‘s right to control the release of information about his
person.218
Warren and Brandeis did not detail the precise contours of this interest.
But they did provide an important foundation for appreciating tort law‘s role in
protecting individuals‘ interest in privacy. For seventy years after The Right to
Privacy, courts developed the interests protected by tort privacy in greater
detail, signaling when privacy mattered and when it deserved protection.
Prosser‘s taxonomy, and narrow judicial interpretations of it, halted those
efforts, but we could continue them now.
Why should we consider returning privacy tort law to a focus on the
protection of a person‘s right to be ―let alone‖?219 As Warren and Brandeis
underscored, privacy honors human dignity by conferring ―respect for
individual choice‖ and ―respect for individuals because they have the capacity
for choice.‖220 It encourages creativity221 and self-development.222 Privacy

216. Randall P. Bezanson, Privacy, Personality, and Social Norms, 41
.
681, 682 (1991). See Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 7, at 1101–02 (suggesting that
Warren and Brandeis‘s use of the phrase ―‗inviolate personality‘ . . . could be viewed as
describing the content of the private sphere‖).
217. Bloustein, supra note 128, at 1003.
218. Id.; see also U.S. Dep‘t of Justice v. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. 749, 763 (1989)
(explaining that ―both the common law and the literal understandings of privacy encompass the
individual‘s control of information concerning his or her person‖).
219. In answering this question, I draw upon a vast literature on the value of privacy, one
spearheaded by Warren and Brandeis and developed in rich detail by thoughtful scholars. See
generally
, supra note 15 (exploring the differing conceptions
of the value of privacy). This Article does not attempt to create anew this important discussion;
instead, it highlights the instrumental and moral value of privacy.
220. Leslie Meltzer Henry, Spheres of Dignity 20 (Sept. 10, 2009) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author). As Leslie Meltzer Henry elegantly develops in her work, people
have dignity insofar as they can make autonomous choices. See Bloustein, supra note 128, at 981–
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provides a space for people to ―make up [their] minds and to develop new
ideas‖223 and fosters social relationships.224 Permitting individuals to form their
personalities free from unwanted interference promotes selfhood and human
relations, furthering a free society.225 In his dissent in Olmstead v. United
States, Justice Brandeis noted that ―the right to be let alone [is] the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.‖226
Many contemporary privacy problems implicate the right to privacy. For
instance, online postings revealing personal information to potential assailants
interfere with the ―right to be let alone.‖ As Warren and Brandeis argued, the
media‘s publication of private facts denied people the ability to live
anonymously, free from prying eyes. When the media published a picture of a
couple‘s deceased conjoined twins, the couple‘s lives became a public
spectacle.227 After the media published a surgical patient‘s before-and-after
pictures, she experienced so much shame that she refused to go to work.228
Postings encouraging assailants to rape or kill people similarly expose
82 (arguing that the legally protected interest at the heart of the tort suggested by Warren and
Brandeis was a person‘s individuality and human dignity). For important discussions of privacy‘s
role in protecting individuals‘ dignity, see
(2000); Robert Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy:
Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77
957, 973–75 (1989).
221. Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52
. 1373, 1424–28 (2000); see also
48 (1988); C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Informational Privacy, or
Gossip: The Central Meaning of the First Amendment, 21
Jul. 2004, at 215,
221 (―The claim that meaningful autonomy requires privacy often involves assertions that for
development, experimentation, and repose, individuals need the capacity to shield themselves, at
various times and places and to varying degrees, from exposure to the critical eyes of the world.‖).
222. As Cohen and Schwartz develop in their work, privacy promotes self-development
that is essential to public discourse. Compare Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational
Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52
. 1373, 1424–28 (2000) (explaining that
information privacy yields collective benefits because it promotes individual autonomy and selfdevelopment, which are central to robust public debate), with Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and
Democracy in Cyberspace, 52
1609, 1651–52 (1999) (arguing that information
privacy rules are a precondition for deliberative autonomy and deliberative democracy). See also
Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or Frontier for Individual
Rights, 44
195 (1992).
223. Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87
. 387, 389 (2008) (―The ability
to freely make up our minds and to develop new ideas thus depends upon a substantial measure of
intellectual privacy.‖); see also Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards For Fair Information
Practice in the U.S. Private Sector, 80
497, 497 (1995) (arguing that ―adequate
standards for the treatment of personal information are a necessary condition for citizen
participation in a democracy‖).
224. See generally
, supra note 15 (exploring the
differing conceptions of the value of privacy).
225. Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89
. 421, 423–24 (1980).
226. 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
227. Bloustein, supra note 128, at 979 (explaining that when a newspaper publishes a
picture of a newborn deformed child, its parents are mortified and insulted that the world should
be witness to their private tragedy).
228. See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text.
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peoples‘ lives in ways that impact their life choices. Such postings draw
unwanted attention to individuals, making them vulnerable to assailants who
otherwise likely would not know about them. Mindful of this exposure,
individuals refuse to leave their homes and change their jobs, just as the
surgical patient refused to go to work after the publication of her pictures.229
Doctors listed on the Nuremberg Files site wore bulletproof vests to work;
many likely stopped performing abortions. Targeted individuals have explained
that because online postings told assailants where to find them, they purchased
alarm systems for their homes and carried baseball bats when going to their
cars.230
Such exposure of individuals can be even more harmful than privacy
invasions of the past. Whereas individuals in the past faced with public
disclosures of stigmatizing private facts withdrew from society, those facing
online revelations of their personal information now have been wounded and
killed. Targeted individuals endure rape and assault, not just feelings that
prevent them from going to work or leaving their homes.231
Leaking databases of information also impair people‘s ability to develop
their inviolate personalities and shape how others see them. In releasing
sensitive information to criminals, database operators prevent individuals from
developing their credit histories, giving identity thieves that privilege. Just as a
newspaper story of a woman‘s plastic surgery or of a person‘s debt changed
how others saw them, credit scores—distorted by identity theft—impact
people‘s reputations by impacting individuals‘ ability to get loans and jobs.
Similarly, medical identity theft undermines people‘s ability to get insurance.
Free from insecure databases, individuals‘ own choices would instead
determine their employability, creditworthiness, and insurability.
The legal community‘s growing conception of the above practices as
impeding privacy interests is a crucial step toward remedying their effects.
Commentators have proposed innovative privacy torts to address contemporary
privacy problems. Sarah Ludington, for instance, has called for a new tort of
information misuse to address data leaks based on the Fair Information Practice
Principles.232 Natalie Regoli has proposed an ―Internet Profiling Tort‖ that
Citron, Law‘s Expressive Value, supra note 23, at 385 (2009).
Tracy L.M. Kennedy, An Exploratory Study of Feminist Experiences in Cyberspace, 3
707, 716 (2000).
231. In some respects, these exposures have much in common with the gendered nature of
Warren and Brandeis‘s approach. Just as Samuel Warren saw tort privacy as a crucial means to
protect his wife from unwanted publicity, here, too, tort privacy could protect women from
postings that turn them into public spectacles.
232. Sarah Ludington, Reigning in the Data Traders: A New Tort for the Misuse of
Personal Information, 66
. 140, 146 (2006) (arguing that the tort would target
―insecure data practices‖ and ―the use of personal information data for purposes extraneous to the
original transaction‖); see also Jonathan Graham, Note, Privacy, Computers, and the Commercial
Dissemination of Personal Information, 65
1395, 1419, 1430 (proposing a ―tort of
commercial dissemination of private information‖).
229.
230.
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would hold a commercial entity liable for its collection, use, or sale of personal
information without informed consent.233
Although these proposals are creative, they might be impractical.234 New
torts can amount to unattainable first-best235 solutions.236 Judges may refuse to
adopt new causes of action due to concerns about legitimacy237 and reversal.238
They may also find it hard to support new torts that require them to mark out
the law‘s contours with little or no precedential support.
Calls for new privacy torts could eclipse second-best solutions, such as
applying mainstream tort concepts to developing privacy issues.239 According
to David Hyman, ―perfection is not the appropriate standard for judging real
world policies and institutions. To believe otherwise is to indulge in the nirvana
fallacy.‖240 Just as Prosser looked to existing law to construct the four privacy
233. Natalie L. Regoli, Comment, A Tort for Prying E-Eyes, 2001
267,
284; cf. Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54
877, 892–
93 (2003).
234. This is not to say that that courts or legislatures should not adopt them. Mainstream
tort claims could, of course, complement these new torts in the event that legislatures or courts
adopted them.
235. In economics, the defining characteristic of a first-best solution is the ―attainment of a
Paretian optimum‖ with ―simultaneous fulfillment of all the optimum conditions.‖ R.G. Lipsey &
Kevin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24
. 11, 13, 11 (1956).
Put simply, first-best solutions are ones that are ideal in a perfect environment whereas secondbest solutions work within environmental constraints and variables. ―First-best solutions are (by
definition) the most attractive, but second-best solutions fare well if they are much more realistic
and give us much of what we want.‖ Stuart Minor Benjamin and Arti K. Rai, Who‘s Afraid of the
APA? What the Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95
269, 335 (2007).
236. Lipsey & Lancaster, supra note 235. As Pierre Schlag explained, a realist
―understands that law is always in negotiation with the world. Law is thus nearly always a secondbest enterprise operating in a second-best world.‖ Pierre Schlag, Formalism and Realism in Ruins
(Mapping the Logics of Collapse), 95
. 195, 210 (2009). I thank my colleague Max
Stearns for his insights on this point.
237. Anita Bernstein, How To Make a New Tort: Three Paradoxes, 75
. 1539,
1546, 1557 (1997) (noting that proposals for a hate speech tort fell flat in part because it seemed
radical and too incompatible with free speech doctrine).
238.
, supra note 142, at 341.
239. Some scholars have already begun looking to traditional tort concepts to address the
new privacy injuries. See, e.g., Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words Are Worth a Picture: A
Privacy Tort Response to Consumer Data Profiling, 98
63, 69 (2003) (arguing
―that collecting and selling or leasing an extensive consumer data profile without consumer
consent should be actionable under the privacy tort known as appropriation‖); Litman, supra note
175, at 1311 (suggesting a tort-based ―breach of trust approach‖ for data privacy protection
because ―[a] relational approach . . . carries significant intuitive appeal‖ and ―its scope can easily
be limited by confining the definition of a qualifying relationship‖). Some scholars have also
suggested borrowing from existing statutory law to prevent violations of data privacy. See, e.g.,
Jeff Sovern, Protecting Privacy with Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation, 69
1305, 1320 (2001) (arguing that the Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits unfair and
deceptive trade practices, ―could in fact offer more informational privacy protection than the
privacy torts because of the extraordinary scope given its language‖).
240. David A. Hyman, Employment-Based Health Insurance and Universal Coverage:
Four Things People Know That Aren‘t So, 9
435, 451
(2009).
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torts, courts could look to mainstream tort concepts to tackle contemporary
privacy injuries. Invoking those claims would appear as ―new wrinkles‖ on
established rules rather than as radical changes in law.241 They would permit
the redress and prevention of privacy injuries while assuring courts that they
were not venturing too far from precedent.242
Invoking traditional tort claims is a promising means to harness law‘s
coercive and expressive value in combating privacy invasions. Although not
originally designed to protect privacy interests, mainstream tort claims could
evolve to do so. Courts could make clear to juries that the torts‘ legally
protected interests include the right to privacy. As juries assessed whether
defendants‘ interfered-with interests were protected by traditional torts, they
would also consider whether and to what extent plaintiffs deserved
compensation for interferences with their ―right to be let alone.‖
In such cases, jury instructions and favorable verdicts would say to the
public that a defendant‘s activities not only violated interests protected by
traditional tort law, but those covered by privacy tort law as well. As discussed
below, database operators would see that their failure to keep sensitive personal
information from release into the hands of identity thieves not only constituted
ultrahazardous activity, warranting strict liability and possibly a breach of
confidence, but also a privacy invasion. Certain website operators—those
publishing personal information alongside suggestions that individuals should
be hurt—would understand their actions as interfering with those individuals‘
right to be ―let alone‖ while also enabling criminal activity.
The next Sections will discuss mainstream tort claims that might be
effective in deterring and remedying contemporary privacy injuries, including
enablement, strict liability, and breach of confidence claims.
1. Tortious Enablement of Criminal Conduct
Certain plaintiffs should, and could, bring enablement torts against
website operators whose postings of personal information interfered with the
plaintiffs‘ right to be free from unwanted publicity. Tort law recognizes claims
against actors who engage in ―risk-generating behavior leading to harms caused
by third-party intervening conduct.‖243 Courts permit recovery in such cases
because the defendant paved the way for the third party to injure another. They
justify imposing liability on the enabling actor due to the deterrence gaps—the
difficulty of finding and punishing the criminal in order to deter would-be

241. Bernstein, supra note 158, at 433.
242. Applying mainstream tort concepts has another attractive feature. It might break down
the artificial wall that has separated privacy torts from the main body of tort law. This would help
free privacy tort law from its neglected doctrinal niche. In turn, privacy claims might have the
opportunity to take advantage of developments occurring in traditional areas of tort law.
243. Robert L. Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49
. 435, 437 n.14 (1999). Rabin
argues there is little difference between inciting misconduct and enabling it. Id.
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tortfeasors.244 As Robert Rabin explains, negligence law‘s deterrence rationale
would be defeated if those enabling wrongdoing can escape judgment by
shifting liability to individuals who cannot be caught and thus deterred.245
Courts have recognized enabling torts in premises liability cases. For
instance, in Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp.,246 the
plaintiff was attacked and robbed in the hallway just outside her apartment. The
landlord left the building unguarded in the face of increasing assaults and
robberies perpetrated against the tenants in the apartment building‘s common
hallways.247 The court held that residential apartment owners had a duty to
exercise reasonable care to protect tenants from third party violence.248 It
explained that the landlord had a ―duty . . . to take those measures of protection
which are within his power and capacity to take, and which can reasonably be
expected to mitigate the risk of intruders assaulting and robbing tenants.‖249
The court underscored the preventative value of creating a duty to protect
against third-party violence, noting that the landlord was in a better position
than the tenant to adopt precautionary measures and better situated than the
police to diminish the risk of criminal assault on its premises.250
According to Meiring de Villiers, courts are more likely to impose
liability for enabling torts when defendants create an opportunity for tortious
conduct that does not exist for the wrongdoer in the ―normal background of
incitements and opportunities.‖251 For example, in Sun Trust Banks, Inc. v.
Killebrew, a robber shot the plaintiff at the defendant‘s automated teller
machine (ATM) at night.252 The court accepted the plaintiff‘s argument that the
defendant failed to exercise due care to keep the premises safe.253 In a
concurrence, Judge Sears noted that the defendant should have foreseen the
possibility of criminal activity because of the unique opportunity for such
conduct that ATMs present, given their weak security and assurance of victims
with money.254
244. Id. at 444.
245. Id.
246. 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
247. Id. at 479.
248. Id. at 487.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 480. Courts have extended premises liability for a third party‘s criminal acts in
cases involving owners of residential property, hospitals, colleges, day care centers, and shopping
centers. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, The Tort of Negligent Enablement of
Cybercrime, 20
1553, 1582 (2005) (arguing in favor of recognition of
negligent enablement of cybercrime claims against software manufacturers for insecure software
that facilitates conversion of credit card numbers, invasion of privacy, identity theft, or
misappropriation of trade secrets).
251. Meiring de Villiers, Reasonable Foreseeability in Information Security Law: A
Forensic Analysis, 30
. 419, 450 (2008).
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 450–51.
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Courts have also recognized theories of liability against those who gather
or communicate information on the theory that their actions negligently,
recklessly, knowingly, or purposefully facilitated criminal conduct.255 Thus, in
Remsburg v. Docusearch, a stalker killed a woman after obtaining the woman‘s
work address from the defendant, a data broker.256 The court found that the
broker had a duty to exercise reasonable care in releasing information to third
parties, due to the risk of criminal misconduct.257 It held that a ―where the
defendant‘s conduct has created an unreasonable risk of criminal misconduct, a
duty is owed to those foreseeably endangered.‖258 The court explained that
―threats posed by stalking and identity theft lead us to conclude that the risk of
criminal misconduct is sufficiently foreseeable so that an investigator has a
duty to exercise reasonable care in disclosing a third person‘s personal
information to a client.‖259 According to the court, information brokers should
know that stalkers often use their services to obtain personal information about
victims and that identity theft is an increasingly common risk associated with
the disclosure of personal information such as an SSN.260
In certain instances, enablement claims ought to vindicate plaintiffs‘
privacy interests. In cases akin to Nuremberg Files, site operators should be
required to compensate individuals, like the targeted doctors, for denying them
their right to remain anonymous from extremists bent on murder.261
Enablement claims could thus be used to deter site operators from disclosing
personal information in ways that interfere with individuals‘ life choices.262
In such circumstances, enablement liability would also satisfy the
enablement tort‘s traditional rationales. Website operators are the most realistic
candidates for deterrence pressure as it can be difficult to find or pursue the
posters.263 Enablement liability would help deter operators, like the group
255. See, e.g., Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997) (concluding that
the publisher of a book on how to commit a contract murder could be held liable on the grounds
that the book‘s purpose was to facilitate crime).
256. 816 A.2d 1001 (N.H. 2003).
257. Id. at 1007.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 1007.
260. Id. at 1008.
261. See supra notes 231–236 and accompanying text (exploring how online postings
revealing personal information to potential assailants interfere with individuals‘ right to be let
alone).
262. Id.
263. Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89
. 61, 118 (2009). As Jack
Balkin explains, much speech on the Internet is anonymous and thus it may be difficult to locate
the speakers. Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36
.
427, 434 (2009). David Robinson explains, however, that advances in computer science may help
plaintiffs and prosecutors find anonymous posters. David Robinson, Identifying John Doe: It
Might Be Easier than You Think,
(Feb. 8, 2010, 8:45 AM),
http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/dgr/identifying-john-doe-it-might-be-easier-you-think.
Nonetheless, posters may be a poor source of deterrence as they may be judgment-proof or be
difficult to find. Balkin, supra at 434.
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running the Nuremberg Files website, from hosting posts encouraging and
facilitating assaults on individuals. It might provide incentive for operators to
remove postings once they receive notice that imposters have used their site to
facilitate physical assaults. Website operators are in a better position to address
the problem than the targeted individuals, who may not know about the
postings and cannot take the postings down themselves.264
Enablement claims may, however, have limited application to privacy
violations. Courts deciding these claims might require proof that website
operators knew about the risk of third-party criminal conduct.265 Website
operators responsible for postings, as in the Nuremburg Files case, would meet
this standard—they orchestrated the postings themselves.
Plaintiffs in more difficult cases might be able to satisfy this requirement
by presenting evidence of similar, prior impersonations of individuals, as in the
Craigslist incidents.266 This may not go far enough, however. Because the First
Amendment might require proof of intentional conduct, some courts will insist
upon evidence that the website operators created the online forum with the
intent to facilitate criminal conduct.267
Additionally, tortious enablement claims against website operators will
face important statutory and constitutional obstacles. Website operators enjoy
immunity from tort liability under section 230(c)(1) of the Communications
Decency Act, which states that ―[n]o provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider.‖268 Section 230 generally
frees online service providers from liability related to the postings of others.269
This safe harbor is inapplicable, however, if the website operator helps create
the content enabling the criminal activity. The anti-abortion group running the
Nuremberg Files site exemplifies a party with no immunity under section 230.

264. In enabling torts, the third party has not superseded causation, as that is the whole
point of the tort. See Bell v. Bd. of Educ., 687 N.E.2d 1325 (N.Y. 1997).
265. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 179, at 1583.
266. A court might question whether website operators can reasonably distinguish an
impersonation of a person interested in rape fantasies from someone with such a genuine interest,
even if the site experienced prior incidents. For instance, a court might ask whether a heavily
trafficked site such as Craigslist could readily determine if a woman posted a genuine interest in
rape fantasies or if an imposter did so to encourage third parties to stalk and rape her. To address
this problem, courts could examine the surrounding circumstances—such as whether the targeted
individual or police contacted the website operator to take down the posting—to assess if the
website operator should have foreseen its enablement of criminal activity. See, e.g., Isaacs v.
Huntington Mem‘l Hosp., 695 P.2d 653 (Cal. 1985) (upholding a premises liability claim, where a
doctor was shot in a hospital parking lot, because the attack was foreseeable given the totality of
the circumstances—the high crime rate in the area, evidence of previous assaults, and the absence
of security at the time of the shooting).
267. See notes 286–305 and accompanying text (discussing First Amendment implications
of enablement claims).
268. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006).
269. Id.
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It is possible that courts will alter their interpretation to require less
involvement by the website operators in creating the offending content.
Recently, the Ninth Circuit refused to extend the immunity under section 230 to
website operators who played some role in unlawful activity.270 Fair Housing
Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com271 addressed whether the
defendant, a website, lost its section 230 immunity by inducing others to violate
antidiscrimination law. As part of its sign-up process, the defendant required
individuals to answer questions about their gender, race, and sexual
orientation.272 The site created user profiles based on this information.273 It also
allowed users to search by various categories and to receive emails containing
profiles meeting their criteria.274 Plaintiffs argued that those questions, if asked
offline, would violate antidiscrimination laws.275
The Ninth Circuit found that section 230 failed to immunize the defendant
from liability because the defendant created the questions and choice of
answers and thus became the ―information content provider.‖276 The court also
ruled that since the site allowed users answering the defendant‘s questions to
choose from a list of possible responses, the defendant was ―the developer, at
least in part, of that information.‖277 The court explained that each user‘s
profile page was partially the defendant‘s responsibility ―because every such
page is a collaborative effort between [the site] and the subscriber.‖278 The
court reasoned that section 230 does not grant immunity for helping third
parties develop unlawful conduct.279
The Roommates.com decision could be used to extend tort liability to
website operators who ask posters to detail the names and addresses of women
who ought to be raped (or are interested in anonymous sex) or who urge
individuals to post SSNs of others. In such cases, site operators would not
enjoy immunity from enablement liability.
Most of the examples referred to in Part I do not, however, fall in this
category. Website operators, such as Craigslist, would enjoy immunity under
section 230 because they merely provide a space for others to post information
and do not prompt posters to reveal specific information. Although courts could
extend the Roommates.com approach to cover website operators who
knowingly display posts that induce criminal conduct, none have done so to

270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1161–62.
Id. at 1161.
Id. at 1162.
Id.
Id. at 1167.
Id. at 1165.
Id. at 1166.
Id. at 1167.
Id. at 1167–68.
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date.280
The recognition of enablement claims as a protection against privacy
invasion also raises free speech concerns. The First Amendment, like section
230, would immunize some website owners against enablement claims. In
Brandenberg v. Ohio,281 the Supreme Court held that abstract advocacy of
lawlessness is protected speech under the First Amendment unless it is intended
to, and is likely to produce, specific imminent lawless action.282 There, the
Court deemed Ku Klux Klan speech ―mere advocacy‖ because it never targeted
a specific group at a specific time but instead expressed generalized ill will
toward various groups.283 Applying this standard, the Court, in NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co., held that even though the Field Secretary of the
National NAACP stated in a speech that ―[i]f we catch you going in any of
them racist stores, we‘re gonna break your . . . neck,‖ 284 the NAACP was not
liable for acts done by ―enforcers‖ of a boycott in Claiborne County,
Mississippi. The Court reasoned that, in context, the statement constituted
hyperbole.285 Some speech found on websites may fall under this same
protection.
Although speech that advocates lawlessness has enjoyed protection under
the First Amendment, it is well established that ―aiding and abetting‖ speech
can be proscribed.286 In Rice v. Palladin Press Enterprises,287 for instance, the
defendant published Hit Man, a book purporting to instruct would-be
assassins.288 The publisher was sued after one of its readers killed three
individuals following the book‘s instructions.289 The Fourth Circuit found that
the publisher could be held civilly liable for ―aiding and abetting‖ a crime.290 It
ruled that the book constituted ―instructional speech‖ that differed from abstract
280. See Note, Badging: Section 230 Immunity in a Web 2.0 World, 123
.
981, 986 (2010) (noting that decisions after Roommates.com have preserved section 230 immunity
and limited Roommates.com to its facts). Scholars argue that Congress ought to amend section 230
to deny website operators immunity if they enable criminal activity, such as cyber harassment.
See, e.g., Nancy S. Kim, Web Site Proprietorship and Online Harassment, 2009
.
993. John Palfrey and Urs Gasser contend that there is no reason why a social network site
―should be protected from liability related to the safety of young people simply because its
business operates online.‖
107 (2008). Any change
in section 230 would, of course, come at a price to free expression online. Balkin, supra note 263,
at 434–35 (explaining that intermediary liability would produce a phenomenon called collateral
censorship); Eric Goldman, Unregulating Online Harassment, 87
59 (2010).
281. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
282. Id. at 447–48.
283. Id. at 448–49.
284. 458 U.S. 886, 902, reh‘g denied, 459 U.S. 898 (1982).
285. Id. at 931.
286. Randall P. Bezanson & Gilbert Cranberg, Institutional Reckless Disregard for Truth
in Public Defamation Actions Against the Press, 90
. 887, 910 (2005).
287. 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997).
288. Id. at 239–40.
289. Id. at 241.
290. Id. at 244.
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incitement of lawlessness protected by the First Amendment.291 The court
reasoned that because the manual directly assisted the hit man, the criminal
activity and expression could not be separated. In essence, the writing was used
as an integral part of a crime sufficient to find the author liable.292
The court in Rice explained that the First Amendment may, in some
circumstances, impose a heightened intent requirement to prevent the
punishment of innocent, lawfully useful speech.293 It suggested that the First
Amendment might bar liability based on ―mere foreseeability or knowledge
that the information one imparts could be misused for an impermissible
purpose.‖294 For the court, such a limitation ―would meet the quite legitimate, if
not compelling, concern of those who publish, broadcast, or distribute to large,
undifferentiated audiences, that the exposure to suit under lesser standards
would be intolerable.‖295 The court reasoned that ―it would not relieve from
liability those who would, for profit or other motive, intentionally assist and
encourage crime and then shamelessly seek refuge in the sanctuary of the First
Amendment.‖296 It hypothesized that the First Amendment would not protect
the publication on the Internet of ―the necessary plans and instructions for
assassinating the President‖ with the specific, indeed even the admitted,
purpose of assisting such crimes.297
As Eugene Volokh explains, several courts have held that speech that
intentionally facilitates crime is constitutionally unprotected.298 Three courts
have ruled that speech that knowingly facilitates crimes is constitutionally
unprotected.299 Meanwhile, three others have found that a newspaper does not
have a First Amendment right to publish a witness‘s name where such
publication might facilitate crimes against the witness. Apparently, these courts
would find this way even if no evidence suggested that the newspaper intended
to facilitate such crime.300 Two other courts would only find liability for such
claims if the Brandenberg incitement test was satisfied.301
Much like the result under section 230, website operators like the one
running the Nuremberg Files would not enjoy immunity from liability on free

291. Id. at 244–45.
292. Id. at 246–47.
293. Id. at 247.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 248.
297. Id.
298. Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57
. 1095, 1129 (2005). I
am grateful to Eugene Volokh for discussing with me the First Amendment concerns that these
cases raise.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 1130; Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969) (finding that abstract
advocacy of lawlessness is protected speech under the First Amendment unless it is intended to,
and is likely to produce, specific imminent lawless action).
301. Id.; see also Brandenberg, 395 U.S. 444.
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speech grounds. Although the Ninth Circuit upheld a lawsuit against the
Nuremberg Files operators because the site‘s postings constituted unprotected
threats,302 it might have done so on the grounds that the site operator intended
to facilitate violence against the abortion providers. Given the majority‘s
finding that that the postings sent the message that ―You‘re Wanted or You‘re
Guilty; You‘ll be shot or killed‖303 in light of the prior murders of doctors
appearing in Wanted posters, it might have found not just an intent to threaten,
but also an intent to facilitate murder.304
On the other hand, courts may immunize from liability website operators
like Craigslist who do not intentionally ―aid and abet‖ crimes such as impersonation, rape, assault, and stalking. They might find, as did the Rice court in
dicta, that upholding enablement claims on negligent, reckless, or knowing
conduct would chill legitimate speech by encouraging operators to take down
genuine assertions by individuals interested in ―rape fantasies‖ and the like.
Thus, enablement claims premised on theories of negligence or recklessness
may be invalid on the grounds of both free speech and section 230.305

302. As the Supreme Court held in Virginia v. Black, threats fall outside the First
Amendment‘s protection if speakers mean to communicate a serious intention to commit an act of
unlawful violence against particular individuals. 538 U.S. 343 (2003). ―The speaker need not
actually intend‖ to commit a violent act because the prohibition of threats ―‗protect[s] individuals
from the fear of violence‘ and ‗from the disruption that fear engenders.‘‖ Id. at 359–60 (quoting
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992)). In Planned Parenthood of
Columbia/Willamette v. American Coalition of Life Activists, the Ninth Circuit found that the First
Amendment did not bar abortion providers‘ lawsuit against the Nuremberg Files website operators
because the portion of the site listing abortion doctors‘ home addresses went ―well beyond the
political message.‖ 290 F.3d 1058, 1079 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc). The court determined that the
site constituted unprotected threats because, even though it contained no explicitly threatening
language, it sent the implied message: ―You‘re Wanted or You‘re Guilty; You‘ll be shot or killed‖
given the prior murders of doctors appearing in Wanted posters. Id. The Planned Parenthood
court was strongly divided, with the majority emphasizing the difference between intimidation by
threat and general advocacy of lawlessness. Id. at 1071–72.
303. Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1085.
304. Id. at 1079–80. Eugene Volokh has argued that some speakers do not have the
―conscious object‖ or the ―aim‖ of producing crime. Volokh, supra note 298, at 1182. The ―deeper
motive . . . is generally ideological, at least setting aside speech said to a few confederates in a
criminal scheme.‖ Id. Speakers, in his view, ―rarely want unknown strangers to commit a crime
unless the crime furthers the speaker‘s political agenda.‖ Id.
305. Volokh has generally opposed legal liability for crime-facilitating speech. Although
such information can be used to commit crimes, it provides information that can be used for
lawful purposes. Volokh, supra note 298, at 1146. In his view, liability for crime-facilitating
speech should be permitted only in a few instances, such as where the speech communicates facts
that have very few lawful uses, such as the publication of SSNs and computer passwords, because
it is both crime-facilitating and has nearly no value beyond its facilitation of a crime. Id. Any
valuable use of such information—alerting others of a security problem—can be accomplished in
less harm-facilitating ways, such as releasing parts of passwords. Id. Under Volokh‘s analysis,
websites hosting SSNs would not be immune from enablement liability, yet sites such as Craigslist
would be protected from liability given the risk that legitimate posts about people‘s sexual
fantasies could be chilled.
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2. Strict Liability
The strict-liability rule of Rylands v. Fletcher also offers a promising
means to address privacy invasions resulting from databases leaking sensitive
personal information. Rylands involved an industrial accident: the flooding of
plaintiff‘s coal mines after water escaped the reservoir of the neighboring
textile mill, which had been built by a contractor.306 The operator of the coal
mine sued the reservoir owner in the Court of the Exchequer and lost.307 On
appeal, the Exchequer Chamber judges found the reservoir owner liable
without fault.308 The House of Lords affirmed. The rule that emerged from
Rylands is that a person who ―brings on his land and collects and keeps there
anything likely to do mischief if it escapes‖ must pay for all of the damage that
is ―the natural consequence of its escape.‖309
Strict liability claims would require database operators to provide redress
for privacy invasions resulting from the unwanted ―escape‖ of people‘s
sensitive personal information into the hands of identity thieves. Leaking
databases deny people the right to limit who has access to their SSNs, birth
dates, medical insurance information, and the like. They interfere with people‘s
ability to develop their inviolate personalities free from identity theft and
insurance fraud.310
Moreover, insecure databases impact people‘s sense of self.311 Rather than
seeing themselves as self-directing agents, victims of database leaks perceive
themselves as ends to others‘ means. This is surely true for the countless
individuals who are denied work and loans due to compromised credit histories
caused by identity theft.312 Strict liability claims could potentially provide
compensation for such interference with individuals‘ right to privacy.
A Rylands v. Fletcher strict-liability approach would also address
traditional tort goals of deterrence. In my previous work, I have argued that

306. Rylands v. Fletcher, [1865] 159 Eng. Rep. 737, 739–40 (L.R. Exch.).
307. Id. at 744.
308. Fletcher v. Rylands, [1866] 1 L.R. Exch. 265, 278.
309. Rylands v. Fletcher, [1868] 3 L.R.E. & I. App. 330, 339, 340 (H.L.).
310. See supra p. 230 (discussing how leaking databases of personal information interfere
with individuals‘ right to privacy).
311. See Henry, supra note 220 (proposing that being treated in an undignified manner
damages a person‘s self respect).
312. See infra text accompanying notes (discussing ChoicePoint incident). Courts have
recognized individuals‘ privacy interest in their Social Security numbers. See, e.g., Greidinger v.
Davis, 988 F.2d 1344, 1353 (4th Cir. 1993) (―[A]rmed with one‘s SSN, an unscrupulous
individual could obtain a person‘s welfare benefits or Social Security benefits, order new checks
at a new address on that person‘s checking account, obtain credit cards, or even obtain the
person‘s paycheck‖). Congress, too, has recognized that the disclosure of SSNs raises serious
privacy concerns. See Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2006) (interpreting
Exemption 6 of FOIA to forbid the disclosure of SSNs); Driver Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2721–23 (barring states from disclosing ―personal information,‖ including SSNs, contained in
motor vehicle licensing records).
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Rylands v. Fletcher provides a powerful metaphor for understanding
economically valuable, yet risky, technologies—like databases of sensitive
personal information.313 Metaphors have long had a profound impact on the
way scholars and judges conceptualize problems.314 Although Rylands
responded to the damage caused by bursting dams and other similar hazards at
the dawn of the industrial age, it also produced a metaphor for economically
valuable, yet risky, technologies—a dynamic reservoir, amassing enormous
power that provides great value if kept in check, but, if let loose (as is
inevitable), could wreak havoc on innocent people not involved in the
enterprise.315
Rylands provides a potent metaphor to conceptualize the characteristic
risks of new technologies at the dawn of the information age. Just as water in a
reservoir is safe inside its confines, sensitive personal information inside
computer databases is harmless if it remains inert. Now, as then, it is the
uncontrolled release of the collected material—in this instance, personal
identifying data—that wreaks havoc on innocent people not involved in the
enterprise.316 Moreover, recognizing Rylands strict-liability claims against
database operators would comport with noted contemporary tort theories.317
Notably, the efficient deterrence theory of Guido Calabresi318 and the fairness
theory of Gregory Keating both support a strict liability approach to leaking
databases of sensitive personal information.319

313. Citron, Reservoirs of Danger, supra note 19, at 283–94 (2007). Because my previous
work provided a detailed analysis of the importance of using Rylands as a metaphor and how
contemporary tort theories might support a strict-liability approach to data leaks, I provide a brief
summary of some of my main points, hoping that interested readers turn to that piece for my fully
developed arguments on the matter.
314. Id. at 278.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 283–92.
318. Calabresi‘s efficient deterrence theory argues that tort law should minimize the costs
of accidents, including the costs of avoiding accidents.
26 (1970). It would attach liability to the
―cheapest cost avoider‖—the party best suited to make the cost-benefit analysis between accident
costs and accident avoidance costs and to act on that analysis. Id. at 26–29. Under this theory,
database operators constitute the cheapest cost avoiders as compared to individuals whose
information sits in a private entity‘s database. Because database operators have distinct
informational advantages about vulnerabilities in their computer networks, they sit in the best
position to make decisions about the costs and benefits of their information collection practices.
319. Gregory Keating‘s fairness theory also supports a strict-liability solution to leaking
databases. Fairness theory provides the ―moral logic‖ for treating strict enterprise liability as the
modern default rule for tort law. Gregory C. Keating, Distributive and Corrective Justice in the
Tort Law of Accidents, 74
193, 202 (2000). It requires an enterprise to
compensate individuals injured by its risky, yet profitable, activities if the victim does not benefit
from those activities to the same extent that the enterprise does. Id. Strict liability exacts a ―just
price‖ for an enterprise‘s freedom to engage in profitable activities where the victim did not
similarly enjoy such a liberty but nonetheless suffered injury. See Gregory C. Keating, Rawlsian
Fairness and Regime Choice in the Law of Accidents, 72
. 1857, 1891 (2004).
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It is not clear whether Prosser would have approved the application of a
strict liability approach to leaking databases of personal information. But his
work as the Reporter for the Second Restatement of Torts provides important
clues to that answer. Section 520 of the Second Restatement addressed the strict
liability standard for abnormally dangerous activities.320 It identified several
factors that suggest the existence of abnormally dangerous activities, including:
the high degree of risk of some harm to people, land, or chattels of others; the
inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; and the extent
to which the activity‘s value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous
attributes.321 The essential question was ―whether the risk created is so unusual,
either because of its magnitude or because of the circumstances surrounding it,
as to justify the imposition of strict liability for the harm that results from it,
even though it is carried on with reasonable care.‖322 The Second Restatement
did not limit strict liability to cases involving land.323
Leaking cyber-reservoirs arguably constitute an abnormally dangerous
activity under Prosser‘s standard. They constitute high-utility activities with
significant residual risk regardless of the care taken by database operators.324
Security breaches are an inevitable byproduct of collecting sensitive personal
information in computer databases.325 No amount of due care will prevent a
significant amount of sensitive data from escaping into the hands of cybercriminals.326 Such cyber reservoirs are also abnormally dangerous due to the
magnitude of the risk involved. A single data leak can involve the release of
millions of Social Security numbers and other personal information into the
hands of identity thieves.327

Under Keating‘s fairness theory, private entities enjoy appreciable profit-making freedoms, such
as gains from the sale of personal information, enhanced workplace efficiency, and a means to
solicit customers in collecting personal data. On balance, the degree of benefit to individuals
whose information is collected is not matched by the detriment they suffer upon the release of
their information. Placing liability on the database operator would fairly distribute the costs of the
release of sensitive data and equalize the burdens and benefits of profitable cyber reservoirs of
information.
320.
519, 520 (1977).
321. Id. § 520.
322. Id. § 520 cmt. f.
323. Id. § 520 cmt. e. The Third Restatement of Torts defines abnormally dangerous
activity as creating a foreseeable and highly significant risk of physical harm even when
reasonable care is exercised by all actors and the activity is not one of common usage.
§ 20 (2005). Although cyber
reservoirs fall outside this definition because they do not cause physical harm, they nonetheless
share defining characteristics of abnormally dangerous activities like blasting and water
reservoirs—high utility and high risk.
324. Citron, Reservoirs of Danger, supra note 19, at 265.
325.
11 (2005), available at http://www.cpppe.umd.edu/
Bookstore/Documents/2005CSISurvey.pdf.
326. Citron, Reservoirs of Danger, supra note 19, at 265.
327. Prosser did note, in 1953, that Rylands should be restricted to activities that were
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Prosser‘s response to the changing nature of injuries in the twentieth
century also provides insight as to how he would have responded to today‘s
cyber reservoirs. When the source of injuries shifted from industrial accidents
to mass consumer harms, Prosser supported an extension of strict liability to
products.328 The source of injuries has again changed, this time from mass
consumer harms to financial vulnerabilities connected to the release of sensitive
personal data. Prosser might very well have responded to this shift as he did for
strict products liability—by supporting the application of Rylands v. Fletcher to
leaking databases of personal information.
As a practical matter, strict liability claims might be limited to cases
where plaintiffs have suffered actual financial harm. Courts have dismissed
negligence claims in cases involving data breaches where plaintiffs identify the
threat of identity theft and the cost of credit monitoring as their injury on the
grounds that the harm is too speculative.329 Nonetheless, an important argument
exists that the cost to monitor one‘s credit—combined with the emotional,
physical, and financial harm associated with the mental distress accompanying
the threat of identity theft—amounts to a tangible, compensable harm.330 Credit
monitoring damages share a similar rationale to awards of medical monitoring
in toxic exposure cases.331 Just as individuals exposed to toxins face the risk of

foreign to the community and inappropriate to its location.
, The Principle of
Rylands v. Fletcher, in
185, 187 (1953). He wrote that Rylands should apply only in cases resembling ―a pig in the
parlor‖—something unexpected and inappropriate to the surrounding circumstances. Id. The
Second Restatement, however, does not deem this factor as dispositive for abnormally dangerous
activities, instead looking to an amalgam of concerns listed in section 520.
§ 520 (1977).
328. See John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the
Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115
524, 582 (2006) (discussing Prosser‘s
role in promoting strict products liability as Reporter of the Second Restatement of Torts).
329. Randolph v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 486 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7–8 (D.D.C. 2007); cf.
Kahle v. Litton Loan Servicing LP, 486 F. Supp. 2d 705, 709–10 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (ruling that
plaintiffs lacked standing to sue in data breach cases due to lack of imminent or actual injury, such
as identity theft). The economic loss rule likely would not bar recovery for the costs associated
with identity theft and monitoring one‘s credit. As Robert Rhee explains, the economic loss rule
applies where parties involved are strangers and the injury is not foreseeable. Robert J. Rhee, A
Production Theory of Pure Economic Loss, 104
. 49 (2010). It covers instances
where liability would be too indeterminate and administratively difficult to sort out and where
contracts would more efficiently address the issue. Id. In this vein, Vincent Johnson contends that
economic loss principles do not apply to data breach cases because the expenses associated with
identity theft and credit monitoring are susceptible to proof with a ―high degree of certainty‖ and
because rights related to the protection of personal data are not proper subjects of bargaining.
Vincent R. Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the Limits of Tort Liability, 57
.
255, 298–301 (2006). Moreover, it would be an absurdity to dismiss negligence claims in data
breach cases due to the lack of actual economic injuries such as identity theft, as courts do and yet
insist that the economic loss rule applies.
330.
,
, supra note 15, at 177.
331. Johnson, supra note 329, at 308.
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future harm, so, too, do victims of data breaches.332 Much like victims of toxic
spills, those subject to a data breach are in a better position to address the risk
of identity theft than the database operator.333
Some may raise concerns that a strict liability approach would bankrupt
defendants as massive data leaks could involve enough individuals to put
companies out of business. However, a system of fixed tort fines could be
created to address leaking databases and keep damages from spiraling out of
control.334 Possible actions include a uniform act adopted by all of the states or
congressional legislation—assuming leaks, at least in Internet databases,
substantially affect interstate commerce. Congress could require that fines for
such leaks hinge upon the size of the firm and the number of people affected.
Such limitations might dispel concerns that a strict liability would force data
collection firms into bankruptcy.
3. Duty of Confidence
Neil Richards and Daniel Solove make an important case for importing
breach of confidence doctrine into privacy tort law.335 They point to the
common law‘s protection of the exchange of information in particular
professional and contractual relationships.336 Confidence law also applies to
certain communications, such as mail and telegrams.337
Confidence law is an underutilized resource for today‘s privacy
problems.338 It should be invoked to remedy and deter defendants‘ interference
with plaintiffs‘ right to be let alone in cases where parties have a relationship
warranting confidence.339 Breach of confidence claims could be used to provide
compensation for unwanted disclosures of personal information. They could
repair and deter invasions of privacy interests in much the same way that strict

332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73
. 772, 852 (1985).
335. Richards & Solove, Privacy‘s Other Path, supra note 172; see also Susan M. Gilles,
Promises Betrayed: Breach of Confidence as a Remedy for Invasions of Privacy, 43
1, 61 (1995) (discussing a ―breach of confidence‖ tort that would ―impose a duty of
confidence on novel relationships without the need to explain why the other duties that typically
attach to a true fiduciary relation are not triggered‖), Randall P. Bezanson, The Right To Privacy
Revisited: Privacy, News, and Social Change, 1890–1990, 80
1133, 1174 (1992)
(―I suggest that the privacy tort be formally interred, and that we look to the concept of breach of
confidence to provide legally enforceable protection from dissemination of identified types of
personal information.‖).
336. Richards & Solove, Privacy‘s Other Path, supra note 172, at 140–45.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 158. Richards and Solove point to English law for helpful developments in the
breach of confidence tort. Id. at 162–73.
339. Courts would determine confidence law‘s applicability by assessing the nature of the
relationship between parties and the norms by which they handle each other‘s personal
information. Id. at 174.
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liability claims would.340
The utility of the breach of confidence tort in protecting privacy can easily
be demonstrated in the employment context. Suppose an employer failed to
secure its information systems, permitting a hacker to obtain an employee‘s
SSN and medical information. Because the employer interfered with the
employee‘s interest in keeping her sensitive personal information from
criminals in violation of a trusted relationship, the breach of confidence tort
would both redress and prevent further violations of the interests protected by
confidence law, as well as the employee‘s right to privacy.341 It would provide
compensation in cases that are all too common today—where estranged
husbands and wives reveal online their spouses‘ sensitive personal information
that might be known to their circle of family and friends but not to employers,
future social contacts, and the like.342 Breach of confidence claims would
compensate and deter unwanted disclosures of personal information that
interfere with individuals‘ ability to develop their inviolate personalities.
Breach of confidence law can vindicate privacy interests while offering
significant practical advantages over the four privacy torts.343 It does not
require plaintiffs to demonstrate that information has been publicized or that
the disclosure would be ―‗highly offensive to a reasonable person.‘‖344 Whereas
the public disclosure tort ―focuses on the content, rather than the source of the
information,‖ the breach of confidence tort focuses on the source and protects
confidential information ―without regard to the degree of its offensiveness.‖345
It can provide relief even when information is spread only to a few others.346
The breach of confidence tort also does not raise free speech concerns in the
same manner as the public disclosure tort.347 According to Randall Bezanson, a
confidentiality approach is preferable to privacy tort law because it is

340. See supra notes 318, 319 and accompanying text (discussing the ways that strict
liability claims could provide compensation for and deter invasions of individuals‘ right to
privacy).
341. In such a case, privacy tort law would not apply because the employer only disclosed
the personal information to a few people. See supra notes 182, 190 (discussing limits of public
disclosure tort).
342. See Leanne Italie, Oversharing on Facebook a Boon to Divorce Lawyers,
, June 28, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/29/facebookovershares-a-boo_n_628940.html.
343. Richards & Solove, Privacy‘s Other Path, supra note 172, at 174.
344. Id. at 175 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 652B, 652D, 652E (1977)).
345. McCormick v. England, 494 S.E.2d 431, 438 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997) (emphasis in
original).
346. Richards & Solove, Privacy‘s Other Path, supra note 172, at 176.
347. Id. As Richards and Solove have argued, because the gravamen of the breach of
confidence tort is the violation of an established relationship, the tort does not raise free speech
concerns in the same manner as do privacy torts, such as public disclosure of private fact. Daniel
J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil Liability, 109
.
1650, 1670 (2009).
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susceptible to consistent and principled application.348
A confidentiality approach, however, has important limits. Because it
requires the existence of a relationship to which it is reasonable to impose
duties of confidence, it would likely not apply to data brokers and others who
lack a relationship with individuals whose information they release.349 For
instance, it would not address privacy injuries caused by data brokers or
website operators who have no relationship with the individuals whose
information they collect or post.
B. Redressing Traditional Privacy Injuries in the Twenty-First Century
Aside from widening the sphere of Prosser‘s taxonomy to include
mainstream torts, there are other ways in which privacy tort law could expand
to meet the needs of today‘s exacerbated harms. This might involve altering
Prosser‘s existing torts by changing the burden of proof. Privacy torts have
long required demanding proof to ensure that plaintiffs cannot recover for the
―merely unpleasant aspects of human interpersonal relationships.‖350
In important respects, today‘s privacy problems dispel concerns that
plaintiffs would recover for trivialities. Public disclosures online are more
lasting and destructive than ever before. They often create an ―indelible
blemish on a person‘s identity.‖351 Although people may attempt to respond to
damaging disclosures in other posts, many may not see them, leaving the
destructive bits in the forefront.
Given the exacerbated nature of privacy injuries in our networked age,
Erwin Chemerinsky has called for changes to revive the public disclosure
tort.352 A possibility in public disclosure cases would be to require proof that a
defendant‘s conduct was ―offensive to the reasonable person,‖ instead of
―highly offensive to the reasonable person.‖ The Restatement of Torts only
demanded that privacy plaintiffs demonstrate that a defendant‘s conduct would
be ―offensive‖ to the reasonable person.353 Adopting one of these weaker

348. Bezanson, supra note 120, at 1174.
349. Richards & Solove, Privacy‘s Other Path, supra note 172, at 178.
350. Munley v. ISC Fin. House, Inc., 584 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Okla. 1978); Kalven, supra
note 24, at 338 (viewing privacy plaintiffs as having ―shabby, unseemly grievances and an interest
in exploitation‖).
351.
, supra note 20, at 94.
352. Erwin Chemerinsky, Rediscovering Brandeis‘s Right to Privacy, 45
645 (2007).
353.
§ 867 cmt. d (1939). Under that standard, courts routinely
dismissed privacy actions on the grounds that the publicly released information would not offend
the person of ordinary sensibilities. Gill v. Hearst Pub. Co., 253 P.2d 441, 445 (Cal. 1953). That
approach got even more restrictive while Prosser served as the Reporter for the Second
Restatement of Torts, which required proof that the conduct be ―highly offensive to the reasonable
person.‖
§ 652D (1977). This accorded with Prosser‘s
criticism of the privacy tort law‘s failure to require proof of extreme outrage and serious mental
harm attested by physical illness. Prosser, supra note 8, at 422. He argued that because privacy
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standards of proof could enable recovery in cases that might otherwise not
seem sufficiently embarrassing, even though they engender serious harm in our
networked age.354
Such a move would, however, raise significant free speech concerns. A
strong argument exists that even with the public disclosure tort‘s
newsworthiness requirement, allowing liability for merely ―offensive conduct‖
would prevent individuals from expressing legitimate criticism about others‘
personal lives. The ―highly offensive‖ standard, when coupled with the
newsworthiness inquiry, arguably secures an important amount of breathing
space for discourse about facts in which the public has an interest.355
Perhaps courts could avoid rewriting the standard of proof required for
privacy torts by considering the Internet‘s magnifying and distorting impact in
assessing such claims. For instance, courts might find that the persistence of
online disclosures would satisfy the ―highly offensive to the reasonable person‖
standard. This would not be unusual: in the defamation context, law has
recognized that the longevity of damaging information deepens its destructive
power. For instance, plaintiffs asserting libel claims (defamation accomplished
in writing) need not prove damages whereas those bringing slander claims
(defamation accomplished in spoken word) do. Courts treat libel and slander
differently based on the assumption that the more permanent the damaging
statements, the more harmful they are.
Moreover, courts could apply the four privacy torts to privacy harms
caused by newer technologies with an eye toward the goals sought by Warren
and Brandeis. This might enable courts to shed some of the rigidity that has
prevented privacy torts from tackling privacy injuries accomplished over digital
networks. For instance, courts might move beyond their narrow conception of
―private‖ information.356 Rather than reflexively dismissing public disclosure
claims on the grounds that plaintiffs revealed personal information to others,
courts might consider such sharing in light of Warren and Brandeis‘s aim to
tort claims sought recovery for emotional distress, they ought to demand the same proof as
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. Id.
354. Another possibility would be to eliminate the intent requirement. As Warren and
Brandeis suggested, ―[t]he invasion of the privacy that is to be protected is equally complete and
equally injurious, whether the motives by which the speaker or writer was actuated are, taken by
themselves, culpable or not.‖ Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 218.
355. Eugene Volokh has argued that the public disclosure tort, in its current form, does not
go far enough to protect free speech concerns. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and
Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About
You, 52
. 1049, 1091 (2000). He contends that ―[e]ven offensive, outrageous,
disrespectful, and dignity-assaulting speech is constitutionally protected.‖ Id. at 1113. In his view,
one‘s reputation should primarily be molded by truthful information, rather than shaped
inaccurately through legal coercion to keep certain details from becoming public. Id. Daniel
Solove offers a different view. See Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less, supra note 201, at 1030.
356. See note 211 and accompanying text (discussing how narrow interpretation of the
meaning of private information has precluded privacy claims despite significant risks faced by
plaintiffs in a networked environment).
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protect individuals‘ right to be ―let alone.‖ While courts should not ignore their
past rulings on the scope of privacy tort law, they nonetheless could infuse their
approach with contemporary expectations about privacy in an age when
individuals share sensitive personal information with trusted social networks.357
Consider a hypothetical student who shares intimate information with a
hundred friends on the popular social network site Facebook. The student has
set the site‘s privacy settings so only friends can view his photographs, wall
musings, and daily updates. The student suffers from a genetic disorder, which
he often discusses with his Facebook friends. Quite unexpectedly, the student‘s
Facebook friend blogs about the student‘s genetic disorder and reveals other
personal information about him as well.358 Under current law, the student likely
could not sue for public disclosure as his sharing of the information with his
Facebook friends meant it was no longer private. Yet if the court considered
Warren and Brandeis‘s broader conception of the right to be ―let alone‖ from
unwanted disclosures, perhaps privacy tort law might consider contemporary
expectations about information sharing within trusted networks online.
Of course, this is but one example. Privacy torts could be infused with the
lessons of Warren and Brandeis‘s right to privacy in various ways. Doing so
might allow privacy torts to adapt to the evolving challenges that we face in our
networked age while honoring the legally protected interests at the heart of
privacy tort law.
CONCLUSION
Although the modern privacy torts, as currently understood, often do not
address many contemporary privacy injuries, it is fruitful to continue the
project that Warren and Brandeis spearheaded and that Prosser developed. To
that end, courts and legislatures could take cues from privacy tort law‘s
intellectual history to ensure its continued vitality. They could employ Warren
and Brandeis‘s conception of the privacy torts‘ legally protected interest—the
protection of the individual‘s inviolate personality by limiting unwanted
disclosures of personal information—while recognizing, as Prosser did, the
persuasive power of precedent.
While I have discussed a number of mainstream tort remedies, my
suggestions are preliminary. In the end, privacy tort law may need wholesale
renovation to address privacy injuries in the information age. It remains,
however, valuable to consider the ways that we can use existing tort remedies
to redress and prevent privacy invasions and to consider the impact of digital
networks on privacy harms in suits involving the four privacy torts.
357. In assessing the right to be let alone, courts would wisely look to Lior Strahelivitz‘s
social network theory to determine if, in that context, plaintiffs should have expected that their
confidantes would have told others. Strahilevitz, supra note 198.
358. For a superb analysis of privacy challenges posted by social media and suggestions to
face them, see James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94
. 1137 (2009).

